[COLOR=rgba(2, 20, 31, 0.85)]
The U.S. Army has a long and unenviable history of being ill-prepared to fight the next war. The French and British had to train U.S. Army units before they were deployed in World War I. The Army entered World War II as the 17th largest army in the world, with underpowered tanks, airplanes, and ancient rifles. The Army that went to Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan had trained long and hard to engage in conventional operations against nation states, but was ill-prepared, psychologically or organizationally, for counter-insurgency war.
[/COLOR][COLOR=rgba(2, 20, 31, 0.85)]
The Army’s ability to adapt to new developments has long been hampered by infighting and excessive conservatism in the upper reaches of the service’s hierarchy.
[/COLOR][COLOR=rgba(2, 20, 31, 0.85)]
To remedy this problem, in July 2018 the Army created the Futures Command (AFC). Its purpose is to unify the service-wide modernization effort under a single command, and oversee the development of new doctrine, equipment, organization, and training. According to Gen. John Murray, its head, the AFC “will conduct war-fighting and technology experimentation together, producing innovative, field-informed war-fighting concepts and working prototypes of systems that have a low risk of… being rejected by future war fighters. There are no game-changing technologies. There are only game-changing combinations of war-fighting concepts, technologies and organizations.”
[/COLOR][COLOR=rgba(2, 20, 31, 0.85)]
To say that General Murray has his work cut out for him is a massive understatement. He surely has one of the most difficult and important assignments in modern military history. [/COLOR]