The Current Events Room
Can the Illogical Inertia of American Involvement in the Middle East Be Broken?
As the article indicates, the Middle East is becoming less strategically relevant. Because the US is energy independent now, or very close to it (although Joe would end that). So if the ME is less strategically relevant, the US should reexamine its strategy for handling the region.
Read the rest of the article at the link.The 29 February 2020 American peace deal with the Taliban, thus far, remains intact. The U.S. military has stopped going after Taliban leaders and fighters and has essentially transitioned to a counterterrorism mission against ISIS-K and similar radical elements. The American public writ-large (to include veterans) wants to leave Afghanistan, and thus supports doing whatever is necessary to withdraw. The Taliban have (mostly) done their part too; they have “refrained” from attacking U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. However, Afghan soldiers, bases, and outposts with no ‘babysitting’ international forces present have been fair play for Taliban attacks. Hence, the Taliban and the U.S. have become odd-bedfellows, each with a strong interest in seeing American troops leave. However, this begs the question: Will the Taliban, an ethno-nationalist insurgent group that has relied on terrorist tactics, actually commit to promises of not allowing al-Qaeda, ISIS-K, and other terrorist organizations to thrive once international security forces are gone by 1 May 2021? The answer, we argue, is complicated.
There is tremendous speculation concerning secret annexes and deals with the Taliban, painting the picture of what a post-Afghanistan with or without a U.S. and coalition presence might look like. Adding to this speculation is the potential reality of zero U.S. “BOG” (Boots on Ground) after 1 May 2021, and whether that ‘zero’ might actually still include a small advisor footprint of security assurance personnel to conduct counterterrorism missions against ISIS-K and any other radical extremist elements. Such a reality is nearly twenty years in the making since the first American ground forces put their boots on the ground in Afghanistan and is – to many – inconceivable. The United States has been engaged in military conflict in the Middle East for as long as some members of the active forces have been alive. At no point in U.S. history has such a phenomenon occurred before. While there is much hope for a future where the U.S. no longer requires military ground forces in the Middle East, hope is not a course of action, and this optimism overlooks the pervading motivations behind America’s longest war. The reality is that the continued illogical logic of American Middle East policy will almost certainly ensure continued military Middle East meddling for the foreseeable future. We do not have to look far for tangible examples to support this assertion.
Syria may give some clues to the future of U.S. military entanglement in Afghanistan and Iraq. Even though President Trump boasted of pulling all American troops from Syria, leading to the perception of America abandoning the Kurds (yet again), a remnant force appeared to stay behind for advise, assist, and enable (A2E) missions with Kurdish militias at al-Tanf garrison, Syria. This base enabled a 55 km deconfliction zone, viewed cynically by some, because protecting oil fields seemed to be the primary mission of the remaining U.S. forces providing A2E to Kurdish militias in Syria. The same questionable logic and justification for continued U.S. military presence extend to the numerous bases and outposts in eastern Syria and northern Iraq supporting anti-ISIS operations, with awkward boxing outmaneuver against Russia and a bona fide ally Turkey.
These moves, while hotly contested in foreign policy circles as to their short- and long-term implications in the region, point to a deeper systemic problem. For better or for worse, and despite the general American apathy (and antipathy) towards the Middle East, American foreign policy elites seem doggedly committed to these wars. The desire to be involved in the outcome of Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and others, suggests that the gambler's fallacy has taken root. It is hard, then, for policymakers and defense hawks to walk away from the Middle East. Decades of expended blood, sweat, tears, and money, compels an enduring American presence inspired by the illogical insistence that ‘this next war will be different.’
Emotional sentiments aside, the Middle East is becoming strategically less relevant.
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Originally Posted by CrusaderKnight
