Did FDR push Japan into attacking?

[iustitia]

So considering how well my topic on Hitler went over I thought I'd make one about Japan. This time I thought I'd make the case even more compelling that war was unnecessary by combining countless sources, dates and quotes into a mosaic timeline.

1937
Washington had been demanding since the mid-1930’s that Japan cease its occupation of strategic Manchuria, an autonomous state on China’s northeastern border. America’s warnings to Tokyo intensified after Japan invaded China in 1937.

1939
From 1939, the Imperial Japanese Navy had been at samurai sword’s drawn with the Imperial Army. They in effect ran two separate wars: the Navy wanted the East Indies’s oil and to dominate the Pacific Ocean. The Army demanded resources be poured into its wars in China and Southeast Asia. In 1939, the United States terminated the 1911 commercial treaty with Japan.

1940
July
July 2
Roosevelt signed the Export Control Act, authorizing the President to license or prohibit the export of essential defense materials.

July 31
Under this authority, "[o]n July 31, exports of aviation motor fuels and lubricants and No. 1 heavy melting iron and steel scrap were restricted." Next, in a move aimed at Japan, Roosevelt slapped an embargo, effective October 16, "on all exports of scrap iron and steel to destinations other than Britain and the nations of the Western Hemisphere."

September
Sept. 27
Nazi Germany, Italy, and Japan signed a Tripartite Treaty, declaring that if one country was a victim of aggression the others would be called to arms on the side of that victimized country.

October.
Oct. 7
The McCollum Memo is authored by Lieutenant Commander Arthur H. McCollum detailing ways in which to provoke Japan into an act of war.

1941
By 1941, Japanese armies were deep in China, a nation that the US considered its sphere of commercial and political interest. Roosevelt issued an ultimatum to Tokyo to get out of China – or else.

March
FDR said to Winston Churchill: "I may never declare war; I may make war. If I were to ask Congress to declare war they might argue about it for three months."

Japanese minister of foreign affairs, Iosuke Matsuoka, arrives in Berlin for talks with Hitler. He does not commit to a deadline for action against the Soviets, leading to a clash with Hitler.

Summer of 1941
Bogged down in a four year war in China she could neither win nor end, having moved into French Indochina, Japan saw herself as near the end of her tether. Inside the government was a powerful faction led by Prime Minister Prince Fumimaro Konoye that desperately did not want a war with the United States. The “pro-Anglo-Saxon” camp included the navy, whose officers had fought alongside the U.S. and Royal navies in World War I, while the war party was centered on the army, Gen. Hideki Tojo and Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka, a bitter anti-American.

July
July 18
Konoye ousted Matsuoka, replacing him with the “pro-Anglo-Saxon” Adm. Teijiro Toyoda.

July 25/26
FDR responds by freezing all Japanese assets in the United States and ending all exports and imports - meaning no crude oil, aviation gas, scrap iron and other strategic commodities on which Japanese industry depended. At the time, the US produced over 50% of the world’s oil supply. Japan produced no oil and imported all of its strategic materials and much of its food.

Stunned, Konoye still pursued his peace policy by winning secret support from the navy and army to meet FDR on the U.S. side of the Pacific to hear and respond to U.S. demands. U.S. Ambassador Joseph Grew implored Washington not to ignore Konoye’s offer, that the prince had convinced him an agreement could be reached on Japanese withdrawal from Indochina and South and Central China. Out of fear of Mao’s armies and Stalin’s Russia, Tokyo wanted to hold a buffer in North China.

One week later Roosevelt embargoed the export of such grades of oil as still were in commercial flow to Japan. The British and the Dutch followed suit, embargoing exports to Japan from their colonies in Southeast Asia.

July 31
Having broken the Japanese diplomatic code, the American leaders knew, among many other things, what Foreign Minister Teijiro Toyoda had communicated to Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura: "Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries, led by England and the United States, are gradually becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it much longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life, must take measures to secure the raw materials of the South Seas."

August
Aug. 28
Japan’s ambassador in Washington presented FDR a personal letter from Konoye imploring him to meet. Tokyo begged us to keep Konoye’s offer secret, as the revelation of a Japanese prime minister’s offering to cross the Pacific to talk to an American president could imperil his government.

September
Sept. 3
The Konoye letter was purposely leaked to the Herald-Tribune.

Sept. 6
Konoye met again at a three-hour dinner with Grew to tell him Japan now agreed with the four principles the Americans were demanding as the basis for peace. No response.

Sept. 29
Grew sent what Herbert Hoover describes as a “prayer” to the president not to let this chance for peace pass by.

Sept. 30
Grew wrote Washington, “Konoye’s warship is ready waiting to take him to Honolulu, Alaska or anyplace designated by the president.”

October
Oct. 16
No response. Konoye’s cabinet fell.

November
In November, the U.S. intercepted two new offers from Tokyo: a Plan A for an end to the China war and occupation of Indochina and, if that were rejected, a Plan B, a modus vivendi where neither side would make any new move. When presented, these, too, were rejected out of hand.

Nov. 5
Marshall and Stark signed a joint memorandum for Roosevelt in which they concluded that "The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-British Staff conversations remain sound.... Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of" several contingencies. These included a Japanese movement "against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies." It also included the movement of Japanese forces across a specified line previously described. Because of their desire for more time to build up forces in the Far East, their final recommendation was: "That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan."

That same day a MAGIC message told them that: "Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month" if Japanese-U.S. relations are to be saved "from falling into a chaotic condition."

Nov. 11
Tokyo to Washington: "Judging from the progress of the conversations, there seem to be indications that the United States is still not fully aware of the exceedingly criticalness of the situation here. The fact remains that the date set forth in my message #736** is absolutely immovable under present conditions. It is a definite dead-line and therefore it is essential that a settlement be reached by about that time. ... The situation is nearing a climax ... time is indeed becoming short."

Nov. 15
Tokyo again: "The date set forth ... is an absolutely immovable one. Please, therefore, make the United States see the light, so as to make possible the signing of the agreement by that date."

Nov. 16
Tokyo yet again: "The fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before.... I set the deadline ... and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate solution.

Nov. 22
Ambassadors' plea to Tokyo for more time was answered: "It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set.... There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you-twenty-ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen."

Nov. 24
Washington officials read a Japanese intercept stating that: "The time limit set ... is in Tokyo time."

Nov. 25
President Franklin Roosevelt surprised his advisors by saying that war with Japan was about to begin. Meeting of FDR’s war council, Secretary of War Henry Stimson’s notes speak of the prevailing consensus:

“He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday [December 1], for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition.... The others brought out the fact that any such expedition to the South as the Japanese were likely to take would be an encirclement of our interests in the Philippines and cutting into our vital supplies of rubber from Malaysia. I pointed out to the President that he had already taken the first steps toward an ultimatum in notifying Japan way back last summer that if she crossed the border into Thailand she was violating our safety and that therefore he had only to point out (to Japan) that to follow any such expedition was a violation of a warning we had already given.”

“We can wipe the Japanese off the map in three months,” wrote Navy Secretary Frank Knox. As Grew had predicted, Japan, a “hara-kiri nation,” proved more likely to fling herself into national suicide for honor than to allow herself to be humiliated.

Nov. 26
A number of Japan's intercepts were translated and circulated. Perhaps the most informative was one sent on November 14, from Tokyo to Hong Kong and eleven other Chinese cities. It read in part: "Though the Imperial Government hopes for great things from the Japan-American negotiations, they do not permit optimism for the future. Should the negotiations collapse, the international situation in which the Empire will find herself will be one of tremendous crisis. Accompanying this, the Empire's foreign policy as it has been decided by the cabinet ... is:
a. We will completely destroy British and American power in China.
b. We will take over all enemy concessions and enemy important rights and interests (customs and minerals, etc.) in China....
We will cope with a world war on a long-time scale. Should our reserves for total war and our future military strength wane, we have decided to reinforce them from the whole Far Eastern area. This has become the whole fundamental policy of the Empire....
Please keep absolutely quiet the existence of these decisions and the fact that they have been transmitted to you."

Officials read another highly interesting intercept sent the day before, probably the 24th U.S. time, from Japanese forces poised at Hanoi to Tokyo: "We are advised by the military that we are to have a reply from the United States on the 25th. If this is true, no doubt the Cabinet will make a decision between peace and war within the next day or two .... Should ... the negotiations not end in a success, since practically all preparations for the campaign have been completed, our forces shall be able to move within the day...."

Also, Roosevelt summoned Hull to the White House and, without consulting his military and naval advisors, authorized Hull to hand the Japanese Ambassadors an ultimatum to Japan that it was known Japan could not accept. Secretary of State Hull presented "peace terms" to the Japanese. The terms presented by Hull were such that in order for Japan to agree to them they would have had to withdraw from China and Southeast Asia, and essentially end all hostilities, something that the administration knew was not going to happen. Of Hull's presentation to Japan, the American Ambassador to Japan stated that it was: "The document that touched the button that started the war."

Nov.27
Hull told Stimson: "I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and Knox-the Army and the Navy."

Nov. 28
Alarming indications that Japan was getting ready for action. A telephone conversation the day before between the Tokyo Foreign Office and one of the Japanese Ambassadors was taped, translated and decoded. It told us that "a crisis does appear imminent." That same day, FDR and his War Cabinet also read a Tokyo cable to Japan's Washington Ambassadors. This cable revealed Japan's highly negative reaction to our ultimatum of the 26th:

"Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions.... From now on do the best you can." The reports from the Philippines about the Japanese expeditionary force moving south were so alarming to Stimson on November 28th that he personally took them to FDR in the White House. 25,000 Japanese troops were going to land somewhere. Later that day, there was a meeting of the War Cabinet at the White House. Stimson's diary reports:

"It was now the opinion of everyone that if this expedition was allowed to get around the southern point of Indochina and go off and land in the Gulf of Siam, either at Bangkok or further west, it would be a terrific blow at all of the three Powers, Britain at Singapore, the Netherlands, and ourselves in the Philippines. It was the consensus of everybody that this must not be allowed. Then we discussed how to prevent it. It was agreed that if the Japanese got into the Isthmus of Kra, the British would fight. It was also agreed that if the British fought, we would have to fight.... It further became a consensus ... that the only thing for us to do was to address it a warning that if it reached a certain place, or a certain line, or a certain point, we should have to fight."

[iustitia]

Nov. 29
Hull met with the British Ambassador. He informed him that he had told our Army and Navy officials that the diplomatic phase "was virtually over." Then "speaking in great confidence" he said "that Japan may move suddenly and with every possible element of surprise and spread out over considerable areas."

Late November
Even in the last days of November and early December, Japan is still seen as making overtures for peace. These were rejected by Washington, in fact Japan notes Washington’s provocative tone (from an intercepted message from Tokyo to Berlin):

"The conversations…between Tokyo and Washington now stand broken…lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude…war may suddenly break out."

In late November, Roosevelt had knowledge that the Japanese fleet was sailing east toward Hawaii, as supported by William Casey of U.S. intelligence. “The British had sent word that a Japanese fleet was steaming east toward Hawaii.” That this information was sent to Washington is confirmed by various British intelligence officers as well. The U.S. commanders in Hawaii, Kimmel and Short, were not forwarded relevant and important intelligence about the situation. This is confirmed by the intelligence officers both in Washington and in Hawaii. For example:

"[I – [Bratton]] never received a definite prohibition on [sending warnings] but every time that I tried to send a message of this sort, and the Navy found out about it, the Chief of Naval operations would call up the Chief of Staff on the telephone and object most vociferously and emphatically. He in turn would call [Miles] and object strenuously, and by the time it got to me…it was disapproval expressed in no uncertain terms…And I in each case would be instructed not to do it again."

December
Dec. 1
The recipients of MAGIC read a Tokyo to Berlin message that stated:

"The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April ... now stand ruptured-broken.... In the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Will Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the developments.... Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams....

Say that by our present moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet and that if Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with all our might; however, right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north." That same day we read Tokyo's instructions for her embassies in London, Hong Kong, Singapore and Manila to destroy their code machines while Washington was informed on how to destroy theirs by chemical means.

Dec. 2
These matters were all discussed at the White House, including proposed FDR messages to Congress and the Japanese Emperor. Stimson met with Marshall, Miles and Gerow concerning their attempts to speed up supplies to the Philippines. Stimson cancelled an out-of-town engagement "in order to stay in Washington over the week end."

Dec. 3
Our War Cabinet read Tokyo's instructions to her Washington Ambassadors to destroy one of their two "Purple" machines and certain other codes. As a result, G-2's Bratton sent a man to observe the Japanese Embassy and confirm the fact that papers were being burned. As Bratton later testified, this "meant that time was running out and the approach of the crisis."

Dec. 4
We ordered our representatives in Tokyo, Bangkok, Peiping, Tientsin and Shanghai to destroy our top code system. Guam was told to "destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified matter" with minor exceptions which they should "Be prepared to destroy instantly in event of emergency." The "Winds Execute" message, about which there has been so much controversy, was received. This indicated Japan's break with the United States and Great Britain, but not Russia.

Dec. 5
The War Cabinet read a December 1 Tokyo order to her London Embassy to dispose of its code machine and to report back when that was done.

Dec. 6
We read a circular MAGIC message of December 2, in which Japan ordered her diplomatic representatives abroad to start "the burning of all their telegraphic codes." That order had been issued to all Japanese officials in North America and the South Seas, as well as those in British and Netherlands territories. Our War Cabinet also read a Japanese December 3rd Rome to Tokyo message reporting on a meeting of Japan's Ambassador with Mussolini in which Mussolini was asked if Japan declared "war on the United States and Great Britain ... would Italy do likewise immediately? Mussolini replied: 'Of course'." That same Saturday morning the members of our War Cabinet read a Japanese December 5th Washington to Tokyo message stating, "We have completed destruction of codes" except for the one "Purple" machine needed for receiving the expected reply to the United States ultimatum of November 26.

The War Cabinet members also read Tokyo's orders for the departure from the United States of certain important Japanese nationals. Then, on Saturday afternoon, December 6, the messages from Tokyo to its Ambassadors in Washington known as #901 and #902. Message #901, known as the Pilot message, informed those privy to MAGIC that the long awaited Japanese reply to our ultimatum would soon be on its way from Tokyo, to be held for delivery at a specified time. As we had learned on November 22, that specified time would undoubtedly be when "things are automatically going to happen."

Based on this, a member of the army’s Signal Intelligence Service later wrote, “Shortly after midday on Saturday, December 6, 1941… [we] knew that war was as certain as death” and “it was known in our agency that Japan would surely attack us in the early afternoon the following day…Not an iota of doubt.” Early afternoon in Washington was early morning in Hawaii.

Message #902, the 14 part reply began coming in that Saturday afternoon, December 6th. Importantly, message #902 was to be sent in English to ensure there were no delays by Washington to translate the message. At the White House, a young Navy Lieutenant was detailed to remain after hours to deliver to Roosevelt material "of such importance that the President expected to receive it." The Lieutenant was told that "during the evening Captain Kramer would bring up some "magic" material and that I was to take it and give it immediately to the President." Meanwhile, the President was busy redrafting a face saving message which went off to the Japanese Emperor at 9 p.m., with an announcement to the press.

At the War Department, the urgency that Saturday afternoon was such that several Army cryptographers were summoned from their homes to expedite the decoding of the anxiously awaited Japanese reply. To keep him informed of important developments, Marshall had Colonels on duty around the clock at his office and orderlies at his residence up to 10 p.m. or, when he was out, until he returned. His office, home and bedside had secure telephones passing through the White House switchboard. Yet, according to Marshall's original testimony before the JCC, he wanted the world to believe that he, like Stark, was unaware of all this quickening of developments crying out for his attention and action.

Still more alarming were the reports from both Admiral Hart in the Philippines and the British, via London, that large Japanese convoys had been seen moving south. Even more alerting was the report that at least one of these convoys had crossed the line which Marshall and Stark had on November 27 told Roosevelt was "a threat to Burma and Singapore.,, In that case the "United States, British and Dutch military authorities in the Far East [had] agreed that joint military counter-action against Japan should be undertaken."

After Roosevelt stationed the fleet at Pearl Harbor, Commander McCollum wrote a memo for him, recommending its use as a lure. Roosevelt implemented the recommendation. Admiral Richardson concluded the administration use of the fleet endangered it gravely, and he argued the point over and over with his superiors. When he took measures to protect his fleet, Roosevelt relieved him. Stark then kept Kimmel uninformed of Japan’s plans to attack it at Pearl Harbor. And Marshall kept Short uninformed.

Dec. 7
At dawn, carrier-based Japanese aircraft had launched a sneak attack devastating the U.S. battle fleet at Pearl Harbor. Almost 3,000 Americans lose their lives. "A date which shall live in infamy" according to FDR. Washington should have known an attack was coming. The 1904 Russo-Japanese War began with a surprise attack on Russia’s important northern China naval base of Port Arthur. In 1941, Japan had a two-year strategic reserve of oil. The US embargo meant that Japan had to either go to war while it still had oil, see itself crippled by the embargo, or pull out of China, something the Imperial Army would not accept.

Japan’s war against the ten times more powerful United States was folly. The architect of the Pearl Harbor attack, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who had lived in the United States, warned beforehand “we are going to war for oil, and I fear we will lose it because of oil.” Yamamoto was absolutely correct. Japan’s main source of oil was the Dutch East Indies (today’s Indonesia), which it quickly conquered.

Dec. 8
Franklin Roosevelt took the rostrum before a joint session of Congress to ask for a declaration of war on Japan and gets it.

Dec. 9
FDR states that there was German pressure on Tokyo to attack Pearl Harbor. FDR's speech pushed his lie that Hitler was involved in Pearl Harbor which he wrongly claimed a "sudden, unprovoked aggression, in accordance to a master joint plan formulated in Berlin and executed by the appropriate fascist military arm." Nothing could be further from the truth.

They were being pressured strongly by Germany to enter the war by attacking the Soviet Union, thereby creating a two-front war for the Communist nation. This strategy came within the actual interests of Japan since they, like Germany, saw Communism as a great evil and a threat to their respective nations. Furthermore, Japan had substantial claims to parts of Manchuria as a result of defeating Russia in the war of 1905. Both Germany and Japan wanted to avoid a war with America at almost any cost.

Roosevelt was well aware of this pressure on Japan by Germany but he felt that it was necessary to protect the Soviet Union as being the best weapon against the Germans, and therefore, he wanted to prevent Japan from attacking Russia. Roosevelt began extensive provocations to cause Japan to abandon its attack on Russia and instead attack America which also served the purpose of giving Roosevelt the reason to enter the war.

Dec. 10
The "Des Moisnes Register" reported that "Germany was described by the president as the power behind the throne in Japan, advising on military strategy." Absolutely false, but America quickly became convinced of false reports claiming either that the Nazis carried out the attack themsleves, lead the attack for the Japanese, or ordered the attack by the Japanese.

Dec. 11
Hitler gives a bellicose speech which is called a declaration of war on the United States. FDR asks Congress for a declaration of war on Germany and gets it. Senator Arthur Capper's "Topeka Daily Capital" agrees that the "President is right in laying upon Hitler the blame for the Japanese attacks without warning on the United States. The mechanized might which the Axis powers have been building for years now is unleashed against the Western Hemisphere." FDR repeatedly uses Pearl Harbor to justify war on Germany despite the Nazis being unable to find it on a map. Within a week of the attack Americans are convinced Hitler was behind Pearl Harbor.

Dec. 12
The Chicago Tribune reports that Germany denies that Hitler's speech was a declaration of war on the United States. Doesn't matter, the story is buried under page 7 and Hitler's "declaration of war" speech isn't relevent again until

1943
January
Jan.
The "unconditional surrender" policy as a conclusion first came into being as a result of the Casablanca Conference between Roosevelt and Churchill, in mid-January, 1943.

1944
June 20
British Cabinet Minister Sir Oliver Lyttelton noted that: "Japan was provoked into attacking the Americans at Pearl Harbor. It is a travesty on history ever to say that America was forced into the war. Everyone knows where American sympathies were. It is incorrect to say that America was ever truly neutral even before America came into the war on a fighting basis."

Mid-1944
By mid-1944, US submarines and mining had cut off 96% of Japan’s imports of oil, strategic material and food. Japan’s navy and air forces became inoperable. Japan began to starve; half its cities were leveled by US fire bomb raids.

1945
May
May 8
The United States captures German documents proving no connection to Pearl Harbor whatsoever, eliminating the justification for US war in Europe. Historians would subsequently whitewash history and justify the war in Europe by claiming Hitler declared war first, severing the overwhelming sentiment at the time that the US was avenging Pearl Harbor by defeating the inferior Japan's white masters in Germany.

July
July 13
Japan sends a telegram to the Soviet Union expressing the desire to surrender and end the war. The US broke the code and also read this telegram. Truman referred in his diary to "the telegram from Jap Emperor asking for peace."

July 16
Truman writes in his diaries "I hope for some sort of peace, but I fear that machines are ahead of morals by some centuries and when morals catch up perhaps there'll be no reason for any of it. I hope not. But we are only termites on a planet and maybe when we bore too deeply into the planet there'll be a reckoning. Who knows?"

July 17
Truman states in his diaries that he knows Stalin will go to war against Japan: "He'll be in the Jap war on August 15. Fini Japs when that comes about."

July 18
Truman states again Stalin will end the war. "I've gotten what I came for - Stalin goes to war [against Japan] August 15 with no strings on it. He wanted a Chinese settlement [in return for entering the Pacific war, China would give Russia some land and other concessions] - and it is practically made - in a better form than I expected. [Chinese Foreign Minister] Soong did better than I asked him. I'll say that we'll end the war a year sooner now, and think of the kids who won't be killed! That is the important thing."

[iustitia]

July 25
Truman writes during the Potsdam Conference in his diaries: "It is certainly a good thing for the world that Hitler's crowd or Stalin's did not discover this atomic bomb. It seems to be the most terrible thing ever discovered, but it can be made the most useful." Despite this, Truman would still drop the bomb. Why drop the bomb on August 6 if the end was at hand just a few days later?

July 26
The United States demands the unconditional surrender of Japan with the Potsdam Conference. This means many things for Japan, including the removal of the Emperor who is seen as a god among the Japanese people.

August
Aug 6
The United States nukes the city of Hiroshima killing at minimum 90,000.

Aug 8
At shortly before midnight, Japanese Ambassador in Moscow is notified: “Starting the next day, August 9, the Soviet Union will consider itself in a state of war with Japan.” As the day in Vladivostok starts seven hours before it does in Moscow, in fact the attack referenced in 9 August below had already begun. In eleven days, Soviet troops covered more than 800 kilometers.

Aug 9
The United States nukes the city of Nagasaki killing at minimum 40,000. Soviets carry out sudden and crushing attack on Japanese in Manchuria and China.

Aug 15
Japan announces a surrender. Others have concluded, on solid basis, that the war could have ended months before the dropping of the bomb – Japan was ready to surrender and had been making many overtures through several channels to this effect. The primary hindrance was the insistence by the United States government (first Roosevelt, then Truman) of unconditional surrender, including the dethroning of the Emperor.

A secondary hindrance might very well have been the desire to use the bomb. Less than one year after the end of the war, the US Strategic Bombing Survey’s official report on the Pacific War appeared. The authors concluded that… “the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs did not defeat Japan….certainly prior to December 31, 1945 and in all probability prior to November 1, 1945 Japan would have surrendered, even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.”

September
Sep 2
Japanese Instrument of Surrender is signed. The Japanese Emperor remains, however, meaning hundreds of thousands were needlessly killed.

Aftermath
Roosevelt had been maneuvering for more than a year to bring the United States into World War II. However, most Americans were against joining Britain’s war against Germany, and had little interest in Asia. Evidence shows that FDR pushed Japan towards war as a means to war with Germany. It was a supported notion that the route to Tokyo was through Berlin. After Pearl Harbor, FDR's repeated justification for declaring war on Germany was that Hitler was pulling the strings of Japan. After years of violating the laws of war and international law, and simultaneously waging war on Germany and pretending to be neutral, FDR finally got America into war in Europe by provoking Japan into attacking us and then linking Hitler to an attack he had nothing to do with.

Out of the war that arose from the refusal to meet Prince Konoye came scores of thousands of American and Japanese dead, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the fall of China to Mao Zedong, the establishment of the United Nations, U.S. wars in Korea and Vietnam, and the rise of a new arrogant China that shows little respect for the great superpower of yesterday. Not to mention that not even a century later Americans are still falling for the false flags of militarist corporatism, such as linking Saddam Hussein to 9/11 to justify the Iraq War.

Conclusion
FDR was a c*nt.

"I think one man is just as good as another so long as he's not a n*gger or a Chinaman. Uncle Will says that the Lord made a White man from dust, a n*gger from mud, then He threw up what was left and it came down a Chinaman. He does hate Chinese and Japs. So do I. It is race prejudice, I guess. But I am strongly of the opinion $#@!es ought to be in Africa, Yellow men in Asia and White men in Europe and America." -Harry Truman, the guy that dropped atomic bombs on the Japanese to force them to surrender after not letting them surrender.

Truman was also a c*nt.

[del]

gee, you don't like fdr and truman.

i had no idea.

it's easy to criticize 70 years afterwards.

enjoy yourself.

[iustitia]

gee, you don't like fdr and truman.

i had no idea.

it's easy to criticize 70 years afterwards.

enjoy yourself.

That was a very well-presented argument. I really enjoyed the total of 0 points you brought up. You've convinced me. Of what I'm not sure but you did it. Keep up the not work.

Sincerely,
Your new dedicated student of the academic field of absolutely $#@!ing nothing

[del]

That was a very well-presented argument. I really enjoyed the total of 0 points you brought up. You've convinced me. Of what I'm not sure but you did it. Keep up the not work.

Sincerely,
Your new dedicated student of the academic field of absolutely $#@!ing nothing

it wasn't an argument; it was an observation

keep up the good work, grasshopper, i'm pulling for you

[iustitia]

it wasn't an argument; it was an observation

keep up the good work, grasshopper, i'm pulling for you

You're certainly right about it not being an argument. Do you make a habit or presenting your "observations" in topics without reading the content beforehand?

[Don]

http://www.thenewamerican.com/compon...med?Itemid=651

I posted this article here about a year ago but most of the responses were about the cherry trees.
The prewar, war and post war info was very interesting.

[Dr. Who]

That was a very well-presented argument. I really enjoyed the total of 0 points you brought up. You've convinced me. Of what I'm not sure but you did it. Keep up the not work.

Sincerely,
Your new dedicated student of the academic field of absolutely $#@!ing nothing

There is no question that America's entry into WWII was manipulated domestically, since without a major attack on American soil, America would have remained on the side lines. That would not have enriched the military industrial complex who were looking for a major pay day given that GB was rapidly running out of funds to prosecute the war.

[del]

You're certainly right about it not being an argument. Do you make a habit or presenting your "observations" in topics without reading the content beforehand?

it was a wonderful bit of cut and paste, but the real you shone through in your trenchant analysis of fdr and truman

c**ts, i believe is the term you used.

brilliant

will durant had nothing on you.