The Islamic State (IS) is rapidly nearing a point of collapse. It has lost control of eastern Mosul to a coalition comprised of the Iraqi military and Kurdish, Shia and Sunni militias supported by the United States and its NATO allies. That same coalition, which has held together despite a very tenuous political consensus, is now penetrating western Mosul. It has seized the airport and controls the remaining city bridge across the Tigris. Despite tough resistance in the old city sections of eastern Mosul, it is expected that the rest of the city will fall in the next six to eight weeks.
In Syria, progress has been slower. Syrian government forces, aided by their Russian and Iranian allies, had previously focused on eliminating the resistance posed by the anti-Assad Syrian rebels and only secondarily on fighting IS militants. The ongoing clash between Turkish forces and those of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the latter largely consisting of Syrian Kurdish militias, and both nominally US allies, has complicated the ground offensive against Islamic State.
ISIS terrorists ride tanks during a June 2014 parade in Raqqa, Syria.
The Turkish supported militias lack sufficient strength to mount an independent campaign against IS forces in Raqqa. The Turkish sponsored campaign in Syria, Operation Euphrates Shield, would require the deployment of additional Turkish troops to pose a credible threat to Islamic State's control of the city. Additional Turkish deployment in Syria would be highly unpopular with Turkish voters. Given that the Erdogan government is in the middle of orchestrating a referendum to amend the Turkish constitution to expand the powers of the presidency, an increase of Turkish troops in Syria is unlikely.
Moreover, the Turkish troops and their sponsored militias are blocked to the south by Syrian troops loyal to the Assad government and to the east by the Kurdish led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Neither group is likely to permit the passage of Turkish troops or their affiliated militias. Despite being dealt out of the Raqqa campaign, Turkish forces can still play the role of a spoiler by engaging SDF forces and disrupting their campaign to seize Raqqa. From Ankara's standpoint, a successful role in the seizure of Raqqa would endow the SDF with the prestige and political support from the US and its NATO allies that it could leverage into broader support for the proposed semi-independent Syrian Kurdish state of Rojava. The Erdogan government has made its opposition to the recognition of Rojava unmistakably clear.
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