Natural law and originalism; Gorsuch
Here is an interesting article that discusses natural law, originalism, and where Gorsuch falls. I am less interested about the attempt to say that there is a large gulf between natural law and originalism, and more interested in the discussion of the topics.
This is a good summary of what the author thinks originalism is:
Better put, an originalist looks to the plain text for meaning. If there is ambiguity, only then do you look at the text from the point of view of the Founders- this includes looking at the various factions among the Founders. I differ from the article in stating that an originalist will resort to natural law if the above still leaves ambiguity in a Constitutional issue. (Because the Founders relied on natural law).Scalia was “a lion of the law” whose judicial philosophy was exactly right: A judge must apply the law as it is, and never as the judge prefers it to be.
The article mainly discusses natural law.
I think the author goes off track with his issue with the moral filter view, even though his explanation acknowledges that it comes up only in extreme cases.The natural law approach to jurisprudence is usually contrasted with “legal positivism.” Positivism is the view that which laws exist, and what those laws say, is a purely factual matter, one that can be investigated only by looking at conventional legal materials such as the congressional record and judicial precedents.
Natural law theorists argue that there is far more to the law than that. They hold that at least in some situations, one cannot know what the law is without first engaging in philosophical inquiry about morality and the nature of right and wrong conduct. These days, natural law theorists usually embrace one or both of two views on the connection between principles of morality on the one hand, and the law as judges must apply it on the other. Following the legal philosopher Liam Murphy, I’ll call these two natural law views the moral filterview and the moral reading view.