Turkey Enters the Fray
I have posted on this before. This is Geopolitical Futures take on the situation.
Over the weekend, Turkey commenced Operation Olive Branch in a small part of northwestern Syria called Afrin. The outcome of the incursion should not create much suspense: Turkey will conquer Afrin with relative ease. The importance of Turkey’s incursion lies instead in the challenges it poses to relations between Turkey and the three other foreign powers invested in Syria’s future: Russia, Iran and the United States. For the second time since 2011, Turkey has deployed its military in Syria from a position of weakness. It will shape the future of Syria from a position of strength.
Never in the field of human conflict has such a limited military operation been threatened for so long: Turkey warned of the invasion of the Syrian Kurdish region of Afrin for almost a year. Serious military operations are not announced via public relations campaigns because the element of surprise is crucial to achieving victory. One reason for Turkey’s bravado is that it doesn’t need the element of surprise to achieve victory in Afrin. The most generous estimates of enemy combatants in Afrin are around 10,000 fighters, lacking armor, artillery and air assets. Turkey has roughly 40,000 troops on the border with plenty of all three. The most serious impediment to Turkey’s invasion was the presence of a small number of Russian soldiers, but once Russia pulled those soldiers out, Afrin’s conquest was assured.
There is a second, more important reason for Turkey’s boisterous year of threats against Afrin: Turkey did not want to invade. It fears being dragged into a quagmire in Syria. When the Syrian civil war began, Turkey relied on proxies to bring down the Bashar Assad regime. When that failed, Turkey made amends with Russia and cosied up to Iran to secure its interests through diplomacy: the so-called Astana Troika. Turkey’s goal in agreeing to the cease-fire negotiated in Astana was to buy its proxies time to strengthen themselves and to prevent the Assad regime from reconquering the country. If Assad could not be defeated, then at least his regime, long hostile to Ankara, would not be allowed to return to its full strength, and at least outside powers would respect that Turkish wish.