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IMPress Polly
08-16-2012, 01:40 PM
What follows is a commentary between Matt (a personal friend) and myself on a three-part PBS documentary on modern Chinese history that I've recommended fairly recently. (I have his permission to disclose his remarks on the subject.) My aim in re-posting these here is to put the material more in context and fill in some details that the documentary, as good as it overall, neglects to include. You will find part one of the documentary at the link below. Our commentary on part one follows.

CHINA: A CENTURY OF REVOLUTION
PART ONE: 1911-1949 (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qg-PgXt8Tkc)
12:12 PM me: First of all, can I get your overall impression of this whole revolutionary process? Then we can look at more specifics.
12:13 PM Matthew: Seemed hard fought, that's for sure.
12:14 PM me: No question about that!
12:16 PM So okay then...
Let's start off with the general and get more specific as we go...
12:17 PM What opinions might you have developed of the Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party)?
(And no, you don't have to give me a "right answer" or what have you. Just whatever you genuinely felt.)
12:19 PM Matthew: Seemed like it started with noble intentions of unifying the country, but got progressively more paranoid about communists taking over and became increasingly more corrupt.
me: I'd largely agree with that.
12:20 PM Here's something they didn't mention in the documentary about the Kuomintang that you might find of interest:
12:21 PM Sun Yat-Sen, the party founder and the guy who launched the 1911 military revolt (thus founding the formal-but-soon-non-existent 'republic') developed three guiding principles for the party.
1) Nationalism, 2) democracy, and 3) socialism.
12:22 PM Matthew: Ah, interesting.
12:23 PM me: It was thus originally conceived of as a sort of democratic socialist party, at least in theory. It was for that reason that the Comintern approved of the Communists uniting with them. (Comintern parties were discouraged from uniting with non-socialist parties, even tactically.) Now of course that was Sun Yat-Sen NOT Chiang Kai-Shek. You may have guessed that the two were rather different people.
12:25 PM Chiang was obviously more anti-communist. He indeed strikes me as simply having been less dedicated to all of Sun Yat-Sen's founding principles. He never did much to develop a socialist section of the economy, he never held elections, and he preferred to attack fellow Chinese (the Communists) rather than the Japanese enemy, even after the invasion.
12:26 PM Would you agree with that summation, or did you have a different take?
12:28 PM Matthew: Nah, I'd say you got it. It said Chiang was a professional soldier at the beginning, he probably wasn't prepared at all for significant power.
12:29 PM me: That's another good point that you raise.
12:30 PM Because even long after they had lost mainland China and retreated to the island of Taiwan (known as Formosa at the time), even in Taiwan, Chiang and the Kuomintang continued to rule by martial law until 1987, and did not allow competing parties until 1989.
12:31 PM Matthew: Wow.
12:32 PM me: Same time frame as the Tiananmen Square democracy demonstrations on the mainland. There was no difference in terms of which (the mainland or Taiwan) was more democratic during and even for some time after the Mao era. Right the 1980s, Taiwan was also a one-party state.
We simply supported Taiwan because it was less socialist.
Not because it was more democratic.
12:33 PM But with the area-wide democracy movement of the late '80s, mainland China and Taiwan responded in different ways. Taiwan opened up democratically. China (clearly) did not.
12:34 PM Matthew: Ah.
me: Mainland China, for all intents and purposes, has never been democratic yet.
Despite being called a "republic" for a century now.
12:35 PM And so now we come to the Communists. What was your general impression of their role in all of this?
12:38 PM Matthew: Seemed like decent people, generally trying to make things better for their fellow countrymen.
12:40 PM me: Not surprisingly, I agree. :P
12:41 PM They actually did agree in early 1946 to form a coalition government with the Kuomintang and even to merge the two armies, but that was before a dispute over Manchuria arose.
12:43 PM Matthew: Ahh.
me: It was very understandable in my mind why things reverted to civil war after the close of WW2. I mean look at how it ended: the Communists had fought hard with the people to win an estimated 35% of the country in the course of the war, and then at the end the Kuomintang just swoops in and asserts control over all the territories the Communists had fought for. (At least they fought the Japanese enemy and not their fellow Chinese!)
12:44 PM There is something deeply wrong about that.
12:45 PM (I refer, of course, to the American airlift of the KMT representatives to take the Japanese surrender in the north, despite the fact that the Communists had done the fighting in the north.)
12:46 PM Matthew: By then, it seems like the Kuomintang was too far gone to have any good intentions anymore.
12:48 PM me: You can sense that in how the urban dwellers (that would be basically people in the KMT-controlled areas) responded to the advance of the People's Liberation Army.
12:49 PM After a certain point, they all just started switching sides.
12:50 PM Matthew: Makes sense to.
me: Well that would probably have a lot to do with the whole history under the KMT on a certain level, but also specifically the war effort against the Communists and their PLA (People's Liberation Army). Funding the war effort drove the cities bankrupt, resulting in runaway inflation.
I think the documentary even touched on that a little.
If for no other reason, the urbanites did NOT support the civil war, especially after WW2.
12:51 PM They wanted to make peace with the Communists.
Not many people shed a tear when the PLA finally rolled in.
12:52 PM Another thing the documentary didn't mention is that the KMT government in the civil war was buoyed by 150,000 American troops.
12:55 PM Matthew: Really? They mentioned aid, but not troops.
me: Oh yes, there were ground troops.
12:58 PM Okay, now let's maybe get to some specific peeps on the commie side, shall we? :D
(Unless you're typing, in which case finish.)
1:00 PM Matthew: Nope, go on.
me: Let's start with the obvious: Mao. What was your overall of him 1) as a person, and 2) as a strategist and tactician?
1:02 PM Matthew: Seemed like a guy with good intentions. And his strategies seemed a lot smarter than the nationalists.
1:04 PM me: I'll go further: to me, they also seemed a lot smarter than those of the Soviet-dominated Communist International (Comintern).
1:05 PM I don't think the Comintern had much of a good role at all in China. They basically just insisted that the Chinese Communists apply the Soviet approach to making revolution. The events of the Northern Expedition and the fact that the Long March happened at all tell me that, had they followed the Comintern's approach, the Chinese Communists would have been wiped out.
1:06 PM Matthew: Probably, yeah.
me: It's very arrogant IMO for foreigners to insist that they know Chinese conditions better than those who live in them.
1:07 PM They HAD to do some original thinking, and Mao was just the guy to offer some.
Matthew: Remove the word Chinese and it could be true for pretty much any country.
1:09 PM me: Stalin, by the way, strongly disagreed with Mao's approach all the way through. He believed that the Chinese Communists under Mao had shifted their party's base fundamentally from being the wage-working classes to instead the rural peasantry, which THEY believed had very different interests. Well I think to a substantial degree, it is true that they changed their base, but like I've explained before, my current definition of the proletariat is based on poverty. I don't believe the peasants were any less revolutionary than the urban workers.
(I agree with your last statement.)
1:13 PM Matthew: Yeah, Stalin doesn't make much sense there.
1:14 PM me: Okay, so a different name now: Zhou Enlai.
He was mentioned at various points.
And that name will be a recurring one in part 2 as well.
So it's best to remember who Zhou was.
1:15 PM Matthew: Who was that again? :p
1:16 PM me: Zhou, as part one mentions, was the guy who led the Red Guards in initially taking Shanghai during the Northern Expedition before they were betrayed by the KMT troops. He was also a prominent figure in the Long March whose decision to side with Mao's line against Otto Braun's was crucial in changing the party's leadership (shifting it to Mao.) He likewise was the guy who negotiated the united front the KMT against Japan in late 1936.
1:17 PM (His name is pronounced like a "ch" in English, as though it were "Chou Enlai".)
1:18 PM Matthew: Ahh.
me: Coming back to you now?
1:19 PM Matthew: A little bit. :p
1:20 PM me: Zhou is one of those pragmatic characters whom I like throughout.
Matthew: What part does he play in the next one? Or are you gonna leave me to find out? :p
1:21 PM me: lol, well you'll find out. ;)
Matthew: Thought so. ;)
me: Speaking of which, this worked out nicely today. Wanna try something similar on Friday?
Concerning part two?
1:22 PM Matthew: Sure!
me: Alrighty, we'll plan on that. :)
Okay, patriotism.
1:23 PM Matthew: Okay. :p

IMPress Polly
08-16-2012, 01:42 PM
me: Obviously that played a role in Mao's strategy. Now in this document by the RCP I've been referencing for some time, they assess that fomenting patriotic sentiment was a big mistake that the Chinese Communists made.
They assess that on the grounds that patriotism contradicts internationalism.
1:24 PM What do you think about that view?
1:25 PM Matthew: It can, but patriotism seemed to do well for them. Especially necessary when Japan invaded.
1:26 PM me: I agree with you. The RCP is just being ridiculously idealistic.
1:27 PM They really seem to believe that the solution to all problems is to "purify" theory.
Matthew: Just regurgitating the usual dogma? :p
1:28 PM me: Well Mao didn't believe that the two were necessarily opposed.
1:29 PM You see, Mao believed in a kind of egalitarian patriotism, wherein all nations are considered equals. Within this framework, nationalism is separated from national chauvinism, which Mao believed was, in fact, anti-internationalist.
1:30 PM Matthew: National Chauvinism?
me: Believing one's nation superior to others.
It was this that Mao believed led to imperialism.
1:31 PM Matthew: Ahh, okay.
me: IMO nothing brings people together like a common enemy.
1:33 PM I would also add though the importance of moderation to their wartime successes. Fighting an aggressive class war did not work in that context. It alienated too many people. They always wound up going back to the 25% rent reduction and moderate stuff like that rather than land redistribution.
Matthew: Reforms and the like?
1:34 PM me: mm hmm. It was actually important in that context to avoid alienating middle class people and even many wealthy people. That too was part of their line. Mao formulated the policy of the Block of Four Classes: the "proletariat" (by which he meant urban workers), the peasantry, the small capitalists, and the large capitalists.
Basically, the whole country against imperialists and local traitors.
1:35 PM With some nuance favoring the interests of the poor (the former two classes).
1:36 PM Formally, the aim was to accomplish a second democratic revolution (they called this a "new democratic revolution" or "new democracy"). For all intents and purposes though, that fell apart with the collapse of the 1946 peace agreement.
1:37 PM Matthew: Ahh.
me: Now land redistribution actually worked out nicely and was well-received after the revolution.
1:38 PM But not so much before.
As you'll find in part two.
Matthew: Ahh. Learned from their mistakes?
me: You'll also find in part two some more on the importance of not being voluntarist (overly aggressive in making changes, assuming that anything is possible with right amount of will-power).
I think I have. I've learned them anew lately.
1:39 PM Matthew: Always good to keep learning.
1:40 PM me: But this has been worth it today because now you know what I mean when I use terms like "the Northern Expedition" and "the Long March" and "people's war" and so on. :D
We're much more on the same page now.
1:43 PM Matthew: Indeed. And it's always interesting to learn something new. :)
1:44 PM me: Oh, I should add something: Mao's people's war / block of four classes concept actually was not original to him in as far as the coalition aspect of it goes. Mao started advocating that kind of coalition at the same time that the Comintern began advocating the policy of the popular front (i.e. coalition of all center-left and democratic forces) in 1935. NOT a coincidence. Stalin's disagreements with Mao were tactical. He disagreed with centering the revolutionary struggle in the countryside for the previously-mentioned reasons. The popular front was actually Comintern policy at the time.
From 1935 until the Comintern was dissolved in 1944, that is.
1:45 PM IMO the popular front policy was the most effective one they ever had.
Matthew: Ahh.
me: Not only in China was it effective, but elsewhere.
1:46 PM For example, the Soviet Union's alliance with the 'democratic' Allies against the 'ultra-right' fascists was seen as part of this.
An INTERNATIONAL application of such a front.
Matthew: Getting people on your side helps run the country better. :p Weird they never seem to get that.
me: With the practical result that the Soviet Union led the way in defeating Germany.

CHINA: A CENTURY OF REVOLUTION
PART TWO: 1949-1976 (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0m7YoNlkWzM)

12:23 PM me: First off, as with yesterday, let me just ask what your general thoughts were on all this?
Matthew: I had a harder time with names in this one. :p
12:24 PM me: Well that's okay. I know there were a lot more.
So let's divide this dialogue into periods this time.
That'll make it easier I think.
12:25 PM First let's go into...let's say 1950-55, encompassing the Korean War, land redistribution, and the cooperative movement.
What were your thoughts on this period?
Matthew: Seems like the classic story of a revolution taking hold of government and slowly getting worse over time.
12:26 PM Seems like the only time things went right.
me: I would say the first six years or so were definitely the best.
12:27 PM Land redistribution went well, as did the cooperative movement.
Those two things were popular, as was women's liberation with women.
Beyond this, we find the policies becoming increasingly extreme and unpopular.
12:28 PM Matthew: Definitely.
12:29 PM me: Now I'll also say that I think much of the problem had to do with a simple lack of democracy. And so, delving into the next period, there was, it occurs to me, a real chance to begin democratizing society. I'm speaking of the Hundred Flowers campaign.
But they didn't take it to its logical conclusion. Instead they backtracked.
12:31 PM Matthew: And even worse, attacked people who did say something. That amazed me.
12:32 PM me: It was terrible, but frankly I think simply a logical extension of the cultural traditions of the country.
12:33 PM China had no experience with democracy. It had always been under an authoritarian system, be it a formal dynasty, warlords, or what have you. I think much of that mentality carried over.
Matthew: Ah, true.
me: Hell, China STILL has only minimal experience with democracy, even today.
12:35 PM The sense in which the Communist Party considered its political system "democratic" was in the sense that there existed a permanent coalition of governing parties supposedly representing the whole population. Of course, the "leading role" of the Communist Party was structurally guaranteed, written right into the constitution, and elections were non-contested, taking place in the form of referendums on individual people selected by said governing coalition for the masses.
12:36 PM Matthew: How democratic. :p
12:37 PM me: And the national constitution also featured (and still features) a convenient catch-all provision attached to its bill of rights stating that none of the aforementioned rights shall be so construed as to legitimize criticism of communism, socialism, the Communist Party, the government, blah blah blah blah blah.
All the Cold War regimes had one of those catch-all provisions negating their bill of rights.
12:39 PM Matthew: Lol.

Mister D
08-16-2012, 01:43 PM
Gotta love those communist totalitarians.

IMPress Polly
08-16-2012, 01:43 PM
me: None of this is to say that I believe these people hated the masses or anything. I don't believe so. I believe they sought to organize what was basically a kind of benevolent, egalitarian autocracy.
12:40 PM I believe that, overall anyway, they genuinely meant well.
Whatever their results.
12:41 PM Matthew: Most did, I'd say. Seemed like a bunch just liked power.
12:42 PM me: And this brings me to another subject.
12:43 PM Did you notice in particular Mao's personal shift away from his pragmatic approach to life into the realm of idealism and naivete?
12:44 PM Particularly as concentrated in major aspects of the Great Leap Forward? (The outlandish production goals that were 10 times higher than what was humanly possible and so on?)
12:45 PM Matthew: Yeah, I'd say so. Seems like the cult of personality started building around him.
12:46 PM me: To a large degree, the cult was already there. It had been built up during the war period in a movement known as the Rectification Campaign (1942-43).
12:47 PM Mao began to actively take advantage of it more I would say beginning in 1962-3 with the advent of the socialist education movement (which was a build-up to the Cultural Revolution).
Matthew: Ahh, okay.
12:48 PM me: I will say though that SOME of that was earned.
I mean people really did genuinely hold Mao in high regard after the 1940s.
Kind of like the regard Americans hold the "founding fathers" in.
12:49 PM Some of it he had earned. But he totally squandered his prestige.
12:51 PM This trajectory Mao was on from realism to idealism, I observe, corresponded to a protracted rejection of his original camp with the Party. The documentary mentions in part two that he had initially surrounded himself with Party moderates like Liu Shaoqi, Peng Dehuai, Zhou Enlai (like I mentioned, that was a recurring and important name), and Deng Xiaoping (who will be VERY important, even central, in part three).
Matthew: Yeah, seems like the founding fathers definitely have the same kind cult.
12:54 PM me: Anyhow, I think you may have noticed that Mao gradually moved away from these more pragmatic people and began surrounding himself with these ultra-left fanatics like Lin Biao and Chen Boda and so on. By the end of the Cultural Revolution, the whole former group was gone in one sense or another and Mao was now surrounded by an entirely different group of comrades at the height of power.
12:55 PM With the sole exception of Zhou Enlai.
Matthew: Who was that again?
12:56 PM me: Whom, by way of tactically joining up with parts of the Cultural Revolution, managed to survive it with a position of authority and wound up negotiating the initial diplomatic rapprochement with the U.S.
You know, the guy who died near the end of part two, had the big funeral that turned into a mass protest?
12:57 PM Matthew: Ahhh.
Okay, I remember now. :p
12:58 PM me: Same guy who, in part one, had led the Red Guards in taking Shanghai during the Northern Expedition, the same guy who had played the deciding role in shifting Party power from Otto Braun to Mao during the Long March, the same guy who had negotiated the united front agreement with Chiang Kai-Shek and the Kuomintang in late 1936.
Same guy.
Matthew: Ah, okay.
12:59 PM me: But anyhow, yeah, it was no coincidence that Mao was removed from power after 1960.
1:00 PM That was pretty much all his top comrades in the former of these groups collectively removing him.
5 minutes
1:06 PM me: In 1962, Deng Xiaoping articulated their outlook pretty well with his metaphor: "It doesn't matter whether it's a black cat or a white cat if it catches mice." What was meant, of course, was that what mattered was the well-being of the masses, not whether the given solutions were essentially socialist or capitalist. The left wing contingent of the party, by contrast, now led by Mao, responded with ideological slogans like "the socialist train that arrives late is better than the capitalist train that arrives on time" and stuff like that. The implication of the Maoist side there is that socialist ideas just sort of validate themselves, regardless of their real-world results. That differs a LOT from Mao's statements during the war, when he had proclaimed something to effect of 'If we are correct, we will advance; if we are not correct, we will not advance'. Mao had, in other words, originally been in the pragmatist camp. But then eventually he shifted over to the idealist camp, taking all of his prestige with him, with catastrophic human results.
Do you think that's basically an accurate summation?
Or would you disagree?
1:07 PM Matthew: I'd say you've got it down well.
1:09 PM Sounds like the difference between you and the modern dogmatic Marxists. :p
1:10 PM me: I hope so. :P
But I will also say that there's more complexity to it yet than that.
1:11 PM For as much as I criticize many of Mao's policy views beginning particularly in the late 1950s, I actually do agree with a few of his distinctive theoretical points.
Even that late in the game.
1:12 PM For example, I don't agree with his methodology of basically just forcing people into the economic models that he did, but I don't necessarily disagree with the communes themselves, for example. I mean as a socio-economic model.
Did you know that there are still a handful of those communes around in China today?
1:13 PM And they, the ones that are still around anyway, actually work pretty well. People who live in them tend to enjoy somewhat better living standards than the average Chinese.
So I don't think the flaws of the Great Leap Forward are necessarily attributable to the corresponding socio-economic model of organization.
1:14 PM But rather to voluntarist production goals and a lack of democratic decision-making, forcing people into new modes of organization rather than relying on persuasion as a general rule, stuff like this.
Matthew: Makes sense.
1:15 PM me: It makes more sense to me as a transit-point to communism as well, I'll say.
1:17 PM I mean, if your aim is to abolish the state apparatus (police, prisons, courts, the military) anyway. The communes are very self-policing and comprehensive, not like the Soviet model of simply nationalizing industries. Government ownership of industries causes society to function almost on an trade-by-trade basis rather than an area-by-area basis. Communes are comprehensive, thus engendering an area-by-area policy-making approach.
1:18 PM The ultimate aim of the Maoist path to communism was to establish China itself as one giant commune.
Matthew: Ah.
1:19 PM me: Or at least that was the aim until 1967, when Mao just sort of arbitrarily turned his back on that approach in favor of organizing society principally into "revolutionary committees" mostly run by the army.
I just don't think Mao was a good economist.
Other people did a better job.
But I can understand his worries as well.
To a point.
1:21 PM During the early '60s, for example, yes there was a swift recovery, but it is worth noting that it came, in part, from reducing the level of central authority within the communes to more and more local levels. That worked BECAUSE the whole system was so undemocratic. But it also had the effect of reducing social organization almost back down to pre-socialist-era levels, and Mao sensed that this was leading to capitalism.
So he wasn't completely without a point.
1:22 PM But the solution, again, was to democratize the decision-making process, and at the national level specifically. Nobody was interested in that.
1:23 PM Or few were, I should say. There were people like Wang Li who were exceptions to that rule.
1:27 PM Matthew: (I'm here, just dunno what to add. :p)
me: One concluding thought I'll add here is that I dearly wish they had included some more statistics in this documentary, particularly in part 2. More data would reveal the complex nature of the Mao era more clearly. It wasn't just all bad. For example, during the Mao era, the rate of literacy (ability to read and write) increased from about 15% to 85% as a result of the new, free education system. Similarly, free (or near-free) health care, particularly in the form of the barefoot doctors program, increased the overall life expectancy of Chinese people from 31 or 32 years in 1949 to 65 or 67 years by 1975.
Do you kind of see what I mean?
1:28 PM Matthew: Ah, those are big benefits.
1:32 PM Yeah, it was pretty much portrayed as all bad.

IMPress Polly
08-16-2012, 01:45 PM
1:33 PM me: Likewise with the Down to the Countryside Movement initiated at the end of the Cultural Revolution. Yes, that was definitely an attempt to punish the Red Guards for excesses, but it was more complex than that too. I mean where, for example, are the interviews with the ordinary peasants who received their help and who composed the overwhelming majority of the population? THEY actually BENEFITTED from that policy, so Westerners don't bother interviewing them on the subject. We are simply to feel sorry for these former urban Red Guards and their families because they had to go work in the countryside. What about the vast peasantry who composed most of the population for whom this was the norm and from which there was no escape? Where's THEIR sympathy in this U.S.-produced documentary?
1:35 PM Nah, PBS would only sympathize with them when it's ideologically convenient (e.g. during the Great Leap Forward).
1:40 PM Matthew: Well, it's the same way people tend to feel more sympathy for newly broke rather than the homeless.
me: Good point.
Great point, actually.
1:42 PM But I think you nonetheless gather an important point from this documentary, which is that what you essentially had during the Mao years was mutual poverty and that WASN'T what the people had signed up for.
Their lives got much better in an overall sense, but they were still living in poverty by the end of Mao's life.
1:43 PM It's hard to provide a better ideological argument for going in a more capitalist direction than that.
1:44 PM In part three, you'll find why I now believe that a capitalist period is all but inevitable in every country, before a SUSTAINABLE path to socialism becomes an option.
I'll also have some info you'll be interested in when you conclude part three concerning how things have developed since.
1:45 PM Matthew: What year does the documentary end at?
1:47 PM me: For all intents and purposes, 1994 (or '97 if you include the acquisition of Hong Kong).
1:48 PM Like seemingly all Western documentaries on socialist societies, it conveniently concludes pretty much with the end of the Cold War and with that logical verdict. It doesn't bother mentioning what's gone down since because it wouldn't be convenient.
1:49 PM Matthew: Sounds about right. :p
me: Then we would have to confront the realities that polls today show that more than 60% of Chinese people believe that 1) inequality is the main problem in Chinese society today, and 2) Communist Party officials should be elected in open primaries, like the Republicans and Democrats are here.
1:52 PM Most Chinese today, especially the youth, WANT their country to be more socialistic.
And more democratic, of course.
Matthew: Of course, the party is having none of that?
1:53 PM me: More or less.
Well, we'll get to that after part three.

CHINA: A CENTURY OF REVOLUTION
PART THREE: 1976-2011 (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=viGtNWVQApk)

12:48 PM me: Didja get to finish part 3?
Matthew: Yup!
me: So, as we usual start off, what would you say was your general, overall impression?
12:49 PM Matthew: Government sucks. :p
me: lol, sounds like a Ronald Reagan inspired line.
12:50 PM Matthew: :p
12:51 PM me: But I mean seriously.
Is there an overriding lesson to be learned from all this?
12:53 PM Matthew: Listen to people when running a country?
me: A big part of it right there.
12:54 PM I think Deng Xiaoping had one partially correct statement in there:
"Communism will not be saved by rhetoric. It will be saved by improving people's living standards."
12:55 PM Matthew: Yup.
me: The Mao era wound up unpopular because it amounted to mutual poverty, even though living standards did improve in many senses. Most people were still hungry by the end of it. Deng's policies gave them food. Beyond the basics, people then want fairness.
12:56 PM And I think it's important not to confuse the order there.
12:57 PM Matthew: Yup.
12:58 PM me: Deng reached his zenith of popularity in the mid '80s. By the late '80s he was not so popular. When you look at the opinion polls that are taken of Chinese people today, you'll find that more than 60% believe that economic inequality is today the country's main problem and that a similar percentage (more than 60%) believes that Communist Party officials should be elected by the public in open primaries like Democratic and Republican candidates are here.
There are two components there: socialism (or a socialistic directionality anyway) and democracy (or...something MORE democratic anyway).'
1:00 PM Studies have found that social upheaval tends to correspond to degrees of economic inequality in society. The more unequal things are, the less social peace there tends to be. China today is one of the most unequal countries on Earth, with steadily rising rates of protests, strikes, and general unrest. And the world's highest suicide rate. (China is also the only country in the world in which women are more likely to commit suicide than men.)
1:02 PM Matthew: Really? Wow.
me: Mm hmm.
1:03 PM Some other things they didn't tell you there include the fact that they dismantled the universal health care system (the barefoot doctors program namely) in 1981 and in 1994 started re-introducing college tuition.
So people now generally have to pay for those things.
1:04 PM I would characterize the '80s for China as basically a reversion back to the Kuomintang's policies, only applied to a nationwide scale.
But, pathetically enough, living standards were still so low at the time that it actually helped most Chinese people on balance.
Matthew: How communist. :p
1:05 PM me: But, pathetically enough, living standards were still so low at the time that it actually helped most Chinese people on balance.
For a while.
And this concentrates the possible necessity of a capitalist period, to one extent or another.
1:06 PM i.e. Maybe the basic lesson of the 20th century was that these socialist experiments were premature, having preceded the point where most of society was already developed and that that's why they failed. That's one possibility in my mind.
Matthew: Makes sense.
1:07 PM me: Or might this have been avoidable, do you think?
1:10 PM Matthew: Can't say I'm sure. Certainly it needs to be more adaptable.
1:11 PM me: I think economic isolation from the world community played a big role.
But as did the fact that the world community at large was capitalist.
1:13 PM I believe that a future socialism needs to involve democratic economic planning processes, not just these top-down plans. And there are the technological resources available today, moreover, to bring real-time social planning into the realm of possibility so that policies can be more speedily adapted to changes in on-the-ground conditions.
1:14 PM And obviously a democratic political system is a must.
That's just part of modernity, IMO.
1:16 PM Well just some general thoughts.
1:17 PM Come on Matt, it's rude to say nothing for over 10 minutes.
Matthew: These documentaries were interesting. :)
1:18 PM me: I thought so tood!
>too
Matthew: (And it was only 7. ;) )

IMPress Polly
08-16-2012, 01:48 PM
Okay, that's all there was to the formal commentary. (I removed our personal remarks.) Just thought I'd provide some food for thought, including my perspective, as a democratic socialist, on China's socialist experiment.

Mister D
08-16-2012, 01:56 PM
Okay, that's all there was to the formal commentary. (I removed our personal remarks.) Just thought I'd provide some food for thought, including my perspective, as a democratic socialist, on China's socialist experiment.

While I agree with some intellectuals, such as Alain De Benoist, that democracy is very narrowly and perhaps too conveniently defined by liberals (I mean that in a very broad sense) "democratic socialism" is simply totalitarian double speak.

URF8
08-16-2012, 02:07 PM
Okay, that's all there was to the formal commentary. (I removed our personal remarks.) Just thought I'd provide some food for thought, including my perspective, as a democratic socialist, on China's socialist experiment.

It's unusual for an American to have this level of knowledge about China during the period from 1911 through the end of the Cultural Revolution. How did you develop this body of knowledge?

IMPress Polly
08-16-2012, 02:19 PM
Thank you! I consider that a very high compliment! :smiley:

Anyhow, there are two basic reasons:

1) I have somewhat of an Asian fetish. I like just about all things far Eastern. That includes having a fascination with the history of the region. I developed that a long time ago, back in grade school, out of an emergent interest in martial arts, anime, and Godzilla, of all things.

2) I have a history of working with and even as part of certain post-Maoist organizations. Such was the case up until last summer. People in the orbit of said organizations were often encouraged to expand their knowledge of the Mao era in China. Although I'm no longer particularly fascinated by that type of extreme left politics, I did learn a lot through that experience (both positively and negatively). I do retain a certain soft spot for aspects of Mao's legacy, even as someone who today disagrees with many, many things that he did.

URF8
08-16-2012, 02:57 PM
The Cultural Revolution has a particular resonance in my family. My wife and her natal family had many unfortunate experiences during that period. If you are interested in the Cultural Revolution I highly recommend the book Red Azalea by Anchee Min. First hand account. Really strikes home.

Peter1469
08-16-2012, 05:51 PM
Thank you! I consider that a very high compliment! :smiley:

Anyhow, there are two basic reasons:

1) I have somewhat of an Asian fetish. I like just about all things far Eastern. That includes having a fascination with the history of the region. I developed that a long time ago, back in grade school, out of an emergent interest in martial arts, anime, and Godzilla, of all things.

2) I have a history of working with and even as part of certain post-Maoist organizations. Such was the case up until last summer. People in the orbit of said organizations were often encouraged to expand their knowledge of the Mao era in China. Although I'm no longer particularly fascinated by that type of extreme left politics, I did learn a lot through that experience (both positively and negatively). I do retain a certain soft spot for aspects of Mao's legacy, even as someone who today disagrees with many, many things that he did.

I minored in history but focused on European 17th and 18th centuries. The China read was fascinating.

How many Chinese did Mao kill again? I mean after the civil war.

Chris
08-16-2012, 06:20 PM
a SUSTAINABLE path to socialism

So have you solved the economic calculation problem yet? Assume you know what everyone wants, how do you best allocate through central planning the limited resources to meet those unlimited wants. The socialist conceded in the 1990s it could not be done. Without such a solution no economy is sustainable.

URF8
08-16-2012, 07:16 PM
...How many Chinese did Mao kill again? I mean after the civil war.

There's really no way of telling. It's estimated that 30-40 million starved to death during the Great Leap Forward.

It's estimated that millions more died during the Cultural Revolution. One of them was my father in law. He was beaten to death by Red Guards. He was a Capitalist Roader.

Peter1469
08-16-2012, 07:36 PM
There's really no way of telling. It's estimated that 30-40 million starved to death during the Great Leap Forward.

It's estimated that millions more died during the Cultural Revolution. One of them was my father in law. He was beaten to death by Red Guards. He was a Capitalist Roader.

Ah, I see. Hard to imagine having fond feelings for such a piece of human filth.

URF8
08-16-2012, 07:54 PM
Ah, I see. Hard to imagine having fond feelings for such a piece of human filth.

After the Cultural Revolution and the trial of the Gang of Four the leadership was restructured in an attempt to prevent the rise of another Mao. It's too bad Mao didn't die in October 1949.

Today Mao is officially honored, and privately abhorred. The Chinese live a contradiction.

RollingWave
08-16-2012, 09:12 PM
A few general comment as I need to run real quick.

A. in WW2 most of the Japanese offensive were clearly driven towards the Nationalist, which was unsurprising given that they were the acknowledged official government at the time. The Communist fought in a wide area in the North yes, but what is not meantioned was that of the Japanese troops stationed in the Chinese theater, there were probably only 10% or so (of mostly logistical or inexperienced troops) stationed in the Northern China region where Mao was operating.

The main Japanese force concentration (other than their base in Manchuria) was essentially a simple one, they want to fight all the way up the Yangtsi river starting from Shanghai (which the Nationalist lost after a 3+ month siege, in which Chang ended up losing most of the few more modernized unit he had) . to the then capital Nanjing (and we all know what happened there) , and then up to Wu Han in the mid section (where a ton of battles were fought ) and then eventually up to the interim capital of ChongQing (but they never made it past the 3 gorges area)

B. Chang actually did hold one election, in late 1947 and early 1948, it was the only free national election held so far on the mainland in it's entire history. where he won the Presidency (which was never in much doubt at that point.) and there were many competing parties at that point. but that's obviously the beautiful sun set before the dusk.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_China_legislative_election,_1948
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_China_presidential_elections,_1948

Also, in Taiwan (and also starting nowadays to a small extend in China), local elections were held during the pre-1987 era. as were limited parlimentary elections (but that only happened when spots were vacanted due to current holders dieing)

3rdly, Chang's policy after he reached Taiwan was pretty clearly socialist oriented, it was actually very much the same policies Mao had in the first few years (before he went bat shit insane.) the socialist nature of the ROC's policy in Taiwan was quite clear until the 1990s, and even today remains at least partially relevant (for example, we have a full health care system, and our universities are largely dominated by the public onces)

Mister D
08-17-2012, 07:40 AM
After the Cultural Revolution and the trial of the Gang of Four the leadership was restructured in an attempt to prevent the rise of another Mao. It's too bad Mao didn't die in October 1949.

Today Mao is officially honored, and privately abhorred. The Chinese live a contradiction.

Life in such societies is all about living contradiction. For example, one pays lip service to Marxism in public long after everyone knows that the system has failed.

Mister D
08-17-2012, 07:42 AM
A few general comment as I need to run real quick.

A. in WW2 most of the Japanese offensive were clearly driven towards the Nationalist, which was unsurprising given that they were the acknowledged official government at the time. The Communist fought in a wide area in the North yes, but what is not meantioned was that of the Japanese troops stationed in the Chinese theater, there were probably only 10% or so (of mostly logistical or inexperienced troops) stationed in the Northern China region where Mao was operating.

The main Japanese force concentration (other than their base in Manchuria) was essentially a simple one, they want to fight all the way up the Yangtsi river starting from Shanghai (which the Nationalist lost after a 3+ month siege, in which Chang ended up losing most of the few more modernized unit he had) . to the then capital Nanjing (and we all know what happened there) , and then up to Wu Han in the mid section (where a ton of battles were fought ) and then eventually up to the interim capital of ChongQing (but they never made it past the 3 gorges area)

B. Chang actually did hold one election, in late 1947 and early 1948, it was the only free national election held so far on the mainland in it's entire history. where he won the Presidency (which was never in much doubt at that point.) and there were many competing parties at that point. but that's obviously the beautiful sun set before the dusk.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_China_legislative_election,_1948
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_China_presidential_elections,_1948

Also, in Taiwan (and also starting nowadays to a small extend in China), local elections were held during the pre-1987 era. as were limited parlimentary elections (but that only happened when spots were vacanted due to current holders dieing)

3rdly, Chang's policy after he reached Taiwan was pretty clearly socialist oriented, it was actually very much the same policies Mao had in the first few years (before he went bat shit insane.) the socialist nature of the ROC's policy in Taiwan was quite clear until the 1990s, and even today remains at least partially relevant (for example, we have a full health care system, and our universities are largely dominated by the public onces)

Good point about Japanese deployment.

RollingWave
08-17-2012, 11:48 AM
Mao is a man of extremes. you can sort of say that he's the Napoleon of China to some extend, bringing both great hope and glory while also great agony and destruction.

Strategically, many chinese historians consider him amongst the greatest in China's long history, evident in him being able to completely flip the table on Chang and also the Korean war to some extend. much of the tactics that haunted the US in Vietnam were pretty much already developed by the CCP in the Chinese civil war and Korean War.

If you study the civil war in it's final extend, it was amongst the most ridiculasly example of strategic victory you'll probably see in modern times, espeically considering the fact that the CCP was clearly technologically inferior, yet they were essentially out manuvering the KMT at every steppe. it was the equivalent of playing an RTS game where one side had map hack on.

(of course, he really DID have map hack on ;) seeing that by then a great deal of the KMT upper command had already been inflitrated. so he pretty much knew all about Chang's plans. which were already strategically uninspiring to begin with, seeing that he needed to take a ton of political and factional consideration into account.)

URF8
08-17-2012, 02:05 PM
The Chinese warned America not to approach the Yalu and Tumen rivers. MacArthur ignored the warning. The rest is history.

RollingWave
08-17-2012, 10:49 PM
MacArthur of course, was also a man of extreme. though not to the same degree as Mao ;)

IMPress Polly
08-18-2012, 06:50 AM
RollingWave wrote:
B. Chang actually did hold one election, in late 1947 and early 1948, it was the only free national election held so far on the mainland in it's entire history. where he won the Presidency (which was never in much doubt at that point.) and there were many competing parties at that point. but that's obviously the beautiful sun set before the dusk.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republi...election,_1948 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_China_legislative_election,_1948)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republi...lections,_1948 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_China_presidential_elections,_1948)

Also, in Taiwan (and also starting nowadays to a small extend in China), local elections were held during the pre-1987 era. as were limited parlimentary elections (but that only happened when spots were vacanted due to current holders dieing)

I Thanked two of your posts here because they are highly informed! Very valuable contributions!

However, I must disagree with your case concerning the idea that authentic "multi-party" elections were held in 1948. The correct expression is that contested elections were held, with opposition partisans being tolerated for some offices. Even looking at your second link above makes it pretty clear that this election process was hardly more open than that of the Communists in practice. The Communists too organized a theoretically "multi-party" system for their part, which included nine political parties. (Of course it was similarly a sham.) Take a look at the second link you provide, for instance. Kuomintang partisans got literally 100% of the vote in the presidential election. Does that sound like a terribly serious election to you?

Only the participation of the Communists could have made the 1948 elections serious. But the government was at war with them.

RollingWave
08-18-2012, 12:54 PM
right, but it was also a election organized just 2 years after a utterly devastating war AND with a civil war still going on, so I think it's kinda amazing that they even managed to pull off some kind of vote.

there were calls to stop the war and let the CCP join the vote, but the CCP correctly procieved that at that point they would have lost because the process of registering the voters was clearly in favor of the KMT, as obviously urban dwellers would be registered at a much more rapid pace than the rural onces.

Still, the requirements of vote here is still clearly different from the vote of the CCP's parliment at the present, it was obviously a very imprefect election, but given the circumstances it's hard to really say that the KMT were intentionally screwing the election.

The really big problem at that point was the simple fact that the military was not seperated from the politics, which was of course not surpring given that China was basically fighting for it's existence at that point so that was no time to talk about the balanec of power . but it was obviously going to make any election process rather problematic.

The one thing that really surprised a lot of people though was that after the retreat to Taiwan, there was not one single military coup until even today (ok there was one but they guy never even left the podium after he declared the coup). which is one of the more remarkable examples of a state being able to successfully seperate the military from the political process, it helps of course that the majority of the servicemen are made up of mandatory draftees who share zero interest with the career soldiers

RollingWave
08-27-2012, 03:13 AM
A brief explaination to give folks a better prespective of the matter.

the history of China in between 1911 (When the Qing dynasty fell) to 1949 (when the Communist won on the mainland). can not be viewed in a vaccum. one has to understand the development of the late Qing period and the background of the revolutionaries to have a better picture of ..

A.Why the revolution generally wasn't a success

B.Why China fell into warlord state during most of this period

C.Why the KMT ended up being rather different towards the end but then appear to reinvented itself after arriving in Taiwan.

D.Why the communist generally won.


The Qing was already in stagnation when the Opium war hit in 1839, one can look deeper into that as well but suffice to say it was not abnormal for Chinese dynasties to be stagnate after a couple of generation, and the Qing had already done pretty well both in terms of the length of their prosperity and the limited scope of their stagnation.

However, China was fast falling behind the world anyway. Europe's developement speed completely changed gear after the age of Discvoery arrived. and China, historically isolated from the developments of Europe was generally unaware of the situation. a few European ships arriving and trading was obviously not enough for them to seriously glimsp the differences. this was only made worse when Britian hit a second accerlation mode in the industrial revolution.

However, regardless of China's relative development, the fact of the matter is that the combination of their stagnating nature (which like most other dynasty, mostly take the form of massive population growth but limited additional economic growth, meaning median wealth declines greatly), combined with the Opium war's devestating effect (the former's problem is really much more serious than the later). meant the destablization of the dynasty.

The main event of the destablization was the Taiping rebellion, started by a nutty scholar from GuangDong that claim to have seen a revelation of god and proclaim himself as the brother of christ. but the claim is not really the point, the point was that GuangDong was amongst the most suffering province of these effect, being both extremely densely populated and also the main port in contact with the west. Thus pretty much any fuse could have ignited this dangerous combination.

The scope of the Taiping rebellion is not well understood outside of China, it stretched over 14 years and caused something along the lines of *20* million death(!!) , in another worlds, it's about half of the casualty of world war one just by itself(!!!) at a time when population was still somewhat lower in the world. the main reason for such a ridiculas death toll is that the raged through one of the most populated regions in the world, which was Southern China, it is the basis of most Chinese dynasty economy, with the region deveasted the economic ripple it has is huge. as million probably starved to death simply because the chief bread basket of China was up in flames.

But the greatest political consequences of the Taiping rebellion is the decentralization of the Qing dynasty. as it's old army was unable to cope with this new age warfare (the Taiping rebel had both a significant portion of fire arms but utilized a lot of hit and run and ran wild in the well connected riverways of Southern China, it was not a conventional war, the Taiping rebels generally had no qualms with giving up cities after they sack it. think of it as the extreme version of the Vietnam war. except that the Qing army didnt' have much technological advantages. so it had to improvise, they did it by shattering pretty much all imperial taboos in one swoop, allowing several officials from southern origins to return to their home region, and raise a local militia that they manage and lead (and mostly finance themself).

This move pretty much breaks all the taboos of imperial China, for one thing, officials selected in the Imperial exams usually are prevented from governnig their home region, these bueracrats should not hold military power, while military power holders should not have any political power. the seperation of military and politics advanced very early in China compare to the rest of the world, and it was obviously done out of many centuries of painful lessons.

However, the Qing was desperate, so they gave up on all these long standing taboos, several major armies in the names of militia were formed in central China. These armies, not burdned by tradtional check and balances and more adaptable to both local conditions (as they are almost all entirely local folks), and to new mlitary concepts from the west. proved effective and succeeded in eventually ending the Taiping rebellion.

But the pandora box was open, these armies became the basis of the new Qing army, which was intended to model on western armies, but in their core they were in fact a regional force. with loyalties lying much stronger to their common origins than to the dynasty. which is a disastor waiting to happen.

Thus went the Qing dynasty finally blew up in 1911, it's armies were very quick to split into local regional warlords, as the seed had already been sowed in the past half century anyway. This essentially lead to China becomming what Afganistan is like today... except about 100 times the magnitude.


(later I'll discuss the problem from the revolutionary side. as much of the above problem may be prevented if the revolution had taken a different form. but I don't want a post to be overly long for now ;))

URF8
08-27-2012, 03:17 PM
RW,

Have you heard of Frederick Townsend Ward? He was an American mercenary during the Taiping Rebellion working for the Qing. He was quite a colorful character. A book was written about him by Caleb Carr called Devil Soldier.

Here's Ward's basic story: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frederick_Townsend_Ward

RollingWave
08-27-2012, 09:24 PM
yeah, he's often meantioned even in highschool text books. though usually only a fleeting passage.

he seem to be the guy they based the villian American in for the last samurai no ? ;)

RollingWave
08-28-2012, 04:38 AM
On the other end, the revolutionaries of China were rather unique in the world, they were not wealthy land holders, they were not those in power in the old regime, and they did not represent any clear class in a class struggle. (indeed Imperial China was a place without much class seperation, at least class based on your birth. )

They were a bunch of young folks with a wide ranging backgrounds that would typically put them as the odd balls of China's society, a young western practice doctor who spent a large part of his youth in the Kingdom of Hawaii, son of converted Chinese missionaries, young men send aboard in the imperial exchange programs as nothing more than a child... well learned classical scholar that refuse to part take in the offical exams... well educated guy that for some reason decide to open a small shop instead of pursuing greater fame...

In short, it was a cast of misfits, folks who are really on the fringes of the traditional Qing society, tha ended up playing a huge role in it's final fall, which goes greatly against conventional wisdom of how revolutions typically occur.

Of course, it is quite obvious that these folks, very few in between and poorly connected to traditional China, have the means to really run a revolution, they were really the idealogues , but the reality of them being able to pull it off relied greatly on the society's general preception that the Qing had lost it's mandate, which was largely established on their ability to maintain order and protect the folks from foreign invasion to begin with.

The new armies that are springing up across China was really their main plateform of means, these folks, both harboring what is in reality regional warlordism, and also recieivng more western influences. are more accepting of the ideals of the revolutionaries (same can't be said for many more traditional folks, Sun Yat San was essentially expelled from his village after he and a few fellow future revolutionary smashed a few local idols). meanwhile, from the revolutionary POV, these new army folks have the one thing they really lack... weapons.... which is why they became natural fits.

However the scope and scale of such revolution remained rather limited in practice, before the overthrow of 1911, the largest rebellion they managed to pull off involved about 1 thousand men... in a country of 130 million (at that time). The Qing routinely tackle bandits with greater scales than that.

However, it was ironically the Qing's attempt to really go all out modernize that sealed their own fate. after years of denial in her last few year Emperess Dowager Cixi finally accepted the fact that full economic and political reform must be done. and it began to take shap across China, massive rail road projects began to be commisioned, and the imperial exam that had been the defining icon of Chinese imperial dynasty was to be abolished.

But the irony of course, was that these changes ended up hurting many many previleged class in the short run. the construction of rail ways meant that they were going to both buy a lot of lands (and since the Qing government was more or less broke, the price they force the landlords to accept is obviously not going to be satisfactory). and will completely change the commercial pattern long established (thus established merchants are upset too), moer over, the core of the Chinese society, the traditional gentry / scholar class, were utterly devastated by the changes to the imperial exam system. a huge number of people, usually with large local influence, staked their life on that, entire economy rise to support it. but now that it's suddenly gone, the entire foundation of the Qing society is essentially broken (Cixi knows this, which was why she had refused to do it for all these years)

So all these soon to be disenfrancished folks turned to the only clear and reasonablly acceptable alterantive left on the scene... those hippy revolutionary idealogues.

And of course, another final death blow to the Qing was the death of Cixi herself, who had ruled China with an iron fist for the last half century, and had managed to bring the Qing back from the brick of destruction during the Taiping rebellion, it was a dangerous tipe rope she had walked all these decades, and now that she's gone, her successor, a 2 year old baby and his young father, was in no position to play a similar game.

Thus the tide swung completely in the other direction in a very short span, not even the revolutionaries really realized it, which was why it was by total accident that a rebellion broke out in October of 1911 in central China, that immediately sparked similar rebellions nation wide. Most of the revolutionary leaders were still aboard at that point, and they hastily rushed back to try and control a situation that was way over their head.

The revolution that blew up in 1911 was in no way a cordinated effort, different region rebelled lead by all sorts of different folks, wealhty merchants, new army officers, disgruntled land lords, you name it. there was abosalutely nothing in common between them except that they're fed up with the Qing dynasty. so the revolutionaries were trying control an impossible mess.

Meanwhile, the fragmented and unorganized nature of these rebels were very soon exposed, which was why o the North and North Eastern area that remained under the Qing control (as it was close to their capital). the tide began to turn quickly against the revolutionaries. the Qing army lead by Yuan Shi Kai, soon handed the rag tag revolutionary armies defeat after defeat. and from a military point of view pretty much all was lost.

But Yuan would prove to be the pivitol figure of China in the 1910s, but not in a good way. he had succeeded Lee Hong Zhang (who was the main Qing administrator, the one who raised the milita army to defeat the Taiping, and also became it's defecto prime minister afterwards.) as the main power dude in the Qing court. with Cixi dead he was basically left unopposed. all he needed was the last title...

He knows that the Qing is finished, that he can win all the military victory now but new rebellions willl follow again and again. so he planed to make the most of the situation. by secretly contacting the revolutionaries. he purpose that he will force the Qing emperor to abocate. but under the condition that he will be the leader of the new republic. given that he realistically held more military power than anyone else in China at that point by a huge margin, the revolutionaries saw little choice but to accept.


Yuan's rule was a disastor in almost all regards. he intended from the start to crown himself Emperor and start a new dynasty, and the few years he ruled basically went all out towards that, he assasinated several prominent revolutionaries that was installed in the new government. and sold out China's soverignty (mostly to Japan) in exchange for support.

But Yuan underestimated the changing times, and also his own fragility. huge rebellion soon rose again across China when he annonced his accencion to Emperor. including Beijing Locals and ex-Qing loyalist, even his own men would not support such an endevor, and he was already fairly old anyway. and soon died in disgrace.

With his death unfortunately, offically ushered the Warlord age in China, as his men and other military leaders across China take advatnage fo the completely ineffectiveness of the Central government and basically carved up China into various fiefdoms. they competeded against each other in the central government ... usually openly bribing congressmens to get into the big office. where their only real aim was to funnel more of the country's money to themself to buff up their military state.

the revoluationaries of coruse, was basically left forgotten, they never held power to began with, their idealogy meaningless as they had no means to implement them even when some were written in the temporary consitution when the Qing fell. but now it's an age where guns talk, and that they had basically none, Sun Yat San spent a few years going between warlords trying to get a backer, but soon he realized that all of them only wants him on their side for the morale highground. devastated. he and his compatriots began seeking any other alternatives.

That alternative became obvious in the end of WW1. which was the Soviets. whom also managed to run a state from a party, while their leaders had previously little power within old Russia. Lenin's situation was surprisingly similar to Sun's, but he managed to pulled it off. which had their Chinese counter parts intrigued.

Thus in the last decade or so of his life, Sun began to in earnest try to turn the revolutionaries (now renamed the KuoMingTan, the People's party , or the Nationalist, as you can see even the name has a hint of Soviet influence) into a Soviet sytle system, the most serious in practice move is the founding of their own army. essentially acknowleding that China is in a warlords state, that can only be solved by becomming warlords themself.

(reached limits for post, add later)

some pictures

Yuan Shi Kai : the man that ruined the revolution (he'd make a totally fine German WW1 general in this picture heh)

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/a/aa/Yuan_shikai.jpg/220px-Yuan_shikai.jpg

A young Sun Yat San and his future revolutionary friends. the bunch of hippies that got thrown onto the big stage unprepared.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/56/Si_Da_Kou.jpg/250px-Si_Da_Kou.jpg

Mao Tse Dong, then still a member of the KMT

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/a/ae/Mao1927.jpg/150px-Mao1927.jpg

Chang Kai shiek in 1912. occupation at the time.... assasian ;) (really!)

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/a/a4/Chiang_Kai-shek_in_1912.jpg/180px-Chiang_Kai-shek_in_1912.jpg

URF8
08-28-2012, 11:12 AM
yeah, he's often meantioned even in highschool text books. though usually only a fleeting passage.

he seem to be the guy they based the villian American in for the last samurai no ? ;)

Possibly. Ward was involved in a series of foreign conflicts that didn't involve America.

Ivan88
09-07-2012, 08:21 PM
The video CHINA: A CENTURY OF REVOLUTION, as interesting and detailed as it was, was also a rigged history that ignored the hidden forces driving China to tragedy after tragedy.

Nothing was mentioned of the various opium wars that Britain fought against China to force them to accept British opium merchants.

Nothing was said about the 1900 invasion of China and seizure of Bejing to force China to accept more opium.

Nothing was said about the behind the scenes maneuvering to alienate the Japanese towards China.

Nothing was said about the US sabotage of Chang Kai Shek. The sabotage was so effective, that Mao owes his victory to the USA.