Peter1469
06-18-2017, 03:34 PM
Why the death of ISIS’s leader could spell trouble (http://www.macleans.ca/news/world/why-the-death-of-isiss-leader-could-spell-trouble/)
I don't agree with the article, but I am posting it for discussion. This is an important topic.
The Islamic State is being shut down regardless of its leader's fate. What happens next?
I have said since the day after the Caliphate went public, that a defeated Islamic State was a greater threat to the US than the proto-state represented.
Ironically, according to some experts, Baghdadi’s death may well put the final nail in ISIS’s coffin, but at the same time it would strengthen al-Qaeda and potentially escalate the dangers posed by transnational terrorism.The devil, in this case, is in the operational details. When Osama bin Laden was killed in 2011, the effects were not so devastating for al-Qaeda. There were a number of structural and logistical reasons for this. The al-Qaeda leadership, by the mid-2000s, had already decided to transform its organization into a brand, which they loaned out to affiliates in exchange for obedience to their cause. The affiliates were then free to use the al-Qaeda name to raise their own funds and attract recruits.
In the wake of bin Laden’s death, al-Qaeda suffered a minor leadership crisis but nothing that caused too much turmoil, in part because bin Laden had positioned his organization ahead of himself, the brand ahead of personality.
The system worked. Even after bin Laden’s death, al-Qaeda’s brand remained a potent symbol in the jihadi universe. The nature of al-Qaeda’s objectives lent itself to this kind of amorphous structure. Unlike ISIS, there was no centralized “caliphate” that drained resources and focused attention on holding geographical space. Nor was there an ideological imperative to pledge allegiance to a caliph. When groups jumped on the al-Qaeda bandwagon, they were investing in a purpose, not a person.
Baghdadi chose a different path, and early on it proved effective. By creating a caliphate and naming himself caliph, he rallied like-minded religious ideologues around a concrete idea.
Where al-Qaeda advocated caution and played the long game, Baghdadi promised the realization of the jihadi dream—the caliphate—in the now. The remarkable growth of ISIS during the early weeks and months after it established its caliphate in Syria and Iraq reflects the power of Baghdadi’s promise.
But ISIS’s strength is also its Achilles’ heel. Baghdadi demanded bay’at, or allegiance, to himself personally. His raison d’etre was the caliphate, a project built on sand that is now in the process of collapsing. Without Baghdadi at the helm, ISIS will lose the uniqueness that separated it from al-Qaeda. Without a caliphate, it becomes al-Qaeda by a different name.
“His status as caliph was important for driving recruitment,” says Colin Clarke, a political scientist at the U.S.-based Rand Corporation. “It’s impossible to predict exactly what will happen in these situations, but killing Baghdadi is a necessary step, though not sufficient, for defeating ISIS.”
RELATED: On the hunt for ISIS weapons in Mosul (http://www.macleans.ca/news/world/on-the-hunt-for-isis-weapons-in-mosul/)
I don't agree with the article, but I am posting it for discussion. This is an important topic.
The Islamic State is being shut down regardless of its leader's fate. What happens next?
I have said since the day after the Caliphate went public, that a defeated Islamic State was a greater threat to the US than the proto-state represented.
Ironically, according to some experts, Baghdadi’s death may well put the final nail in ISIS’s coffin, but at the same time it would strengthen al-Qaeda and potentially escalate the dangers posed by transnational terrorism.The devil, in this case, is in the operational details. When Osama bin Laden was killed in 2011, the effects were not so devastating for al-Qaeda. There were a number of structural and logistical reasons for this. The al-Qaeda leadership, by the mid-2000s, had already decided to transform its organization into a brand, which they loaned out to affiliates in exchange for obedience to their cause. The affiliates were then free to use the al-Qaeda name to raise their own funds and attract recruits.
In the wake of bin Laden’s death, al-Qaeda suffered a minor leadership crisis but nothing that caused too much turmoil, in part because bin Laden had positioned his organization ahead of himself, the brand ahead of personality.
The system worked. Even after bin Laden’s death, al-Qaeda’s brand remained a potent symbol in the jihadi universe. The nature of al-Qaeda’s objectives lent itself to this kind of amorphous structure. Unlike ISIS, there was no centralized “caliphate” that drained resources and focused attention on holding geographical space. Nor was there an ideological imperative to pledge allegiance to a caliph. When groups jumped on the al-Qaeda bandwagon, they were investing in a purpose, not a person.
Baghdadi chose a different path, and early on it proved effective. By creating a caliphate and naming himself caliph, he rallied like-minded religious ideologues around a concrete idea.
Where al-Qaeda advocated caution and played the long game, Baghdadi promised the realization of the jihadi dream—the caliphate—in the now. The remarkable growth of ISIS during the early weeks and months after it established its caliphate in Syria and Iraq reflects the power of Baghdadi’s promise.
But ISIS’s strength is also its Achilles’ heel. Baghdadi demanded bay’at, or allegiance, to himself personally. His raison d’etre was the caliphate, a project built on sand that is now in the process of collapsing. Without Baghdadi at the helm, ISIS will lose the uniqueness that separated it from al-Qaeda. Without a caliphate, it becomes al-Qaeda by a different name.
“His status as caliph was important for driving recruitment,” says Colin Clarke, a political scientist at the U.S.-based Rand Corporation. “It’s impossible to predict exactly what will happen in these situations, but killing Baghdadi is a necessary step, though not sufficient, for defeating ISIS.”
RELATED: On the hunt for ISIS weapons in Mosul (http://www.macleans.ca/news/world/on-the-hunt-for-isis-weapons-in-mosul/)