This is a follow-up to my previous comments and readers may wish to re-read that post before moving on with this one.
Polly, I point you to your comment:
Quote- X: “The memory of the catastrophic WW2 Nazi invasion is no joke or trivial thing in Moscow.”
That describes the core of my position. The Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and today’s Russia based their grand strategy (defensive) on the fact that there are no natural land barriers to invasion. Focusing on the western borders, the Great European Plain has been an historical invasion route from Western Europe into Asia (a well as the reverse). Since there are no natural barriers to invasion, Russia must have depth. In the past Russia achieved this by annexing territory, or otherwise controlling it.
During the Cold War NATO was 1600 kilometers from St. Petersburg. With the end of the Cold War and the accession of the Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) to NATO that distance dropped to 160 kilometers. Depth…. That leaves Belarus and Ukraine as buffers (and Belarus is solid pro-Russia).Ukraine is 480 kilometers from Moscow at its closest point. Depth…. Return to the quote above and you will see what drives Russia today. It isn’t the paranoia that western media blames Putin’s behavior on: it is history and geography.[Hat-tip to STRATFOR for the distances.]
Today, Russia can easier achieve this depth through soft power- i.e. diplomatic pressure, economic treaties, etc. This is why I don’t think that Russia will invade Ukraine (beyond Crimea, I will address that later). If Russia does invade Ukraine it is not to annex it, but rather to use it as a diplomatic pawn to give away for other concessions (and perhaps to end the conflict with public approval on its side). [Added today- one of Russia’s main goals in Syria is to obtain concessions in Ukraine.]
So Russia’s goal is for Ukraine to remain an independent state, although with deep internal divisions that render it neutral in the West – East debate. Even better, Ukraine would elect another pro-Russian government. But what Russia will not allow is a strong pro-Western government, and most certainly not a government which seeks NATO membership. That, to Russia, is an existential threat and a
casus belli for war.
About Crimea: Russia still feels disrespected by the West. Russia didn’t need Crimea to secure its Black Sea Fleet; Russia has a long-term lease securing that base. The Crimean people and government are very pro-Russian, so Russia didn’t need to annex it. Russia did it for Russian pride. It was a calculated risk that the west wouldn’t go to war over Crimea (historically Crimea is Russian anyway). I don’t think that Russia will take that same risk with Ukraine; although the west is unlikely to respond militarily, Russia doesn’t want to have to rule over the pro-western portions of Ukraine. And as I argue above, they don’t need to and they can’t afford it.
So, no, I don’t think that the Cold War has started again. I think that
Russia is looking for her depth.