The War if Ukraine if nothing else raises interest foreign policy. Toward a New Conservative Foreign Policy Consensus lays out various views and suggests a new conservative one while admitting debate is taking place on the right. New to this I take no stance. Long, I'll try to paraphrase.
It begins with views from political scientists and international security specialists. Here there are two positions: realism, "which focuses on the relative power of states in the international system," and liberal internationalism, "which stresses the role of cooperation, norms, and international institutions in the international system." And under these fall various categories: primacy, strategic disengagement, selective engagement, and cooperative internationalism. US policy fits none well.
Historians offer another view, these deriving largely from Walter Russell Mead's Special Providence. They include Jeffersonians, "concerned primarily with liberty at home, have traditionally been suspicious of a large military and large-scale international projects;" Hamiltonians, "tended to support international engagement in order to support not only American power but also prosperity;" Jacksonians, "support a strong military;" and Wilsonians, "moral missionaries, willing to use force in order to spread democracy." Historically, conservatives have debated among Hamiltonians and Jeffersonians, until Bush "combined Wilsonianism and Hamiltonianism, a hybrid that goes under the rubric of 'neoconservative.'"
Trump foreign policy has been seen as "an explicit rejection of neoconservative foreign policy." It's somewhat a "fusion of Hamiltonianism and Jacksonianism. The author argues it has five pillars: healthy nationalism, "not ethnic or racial nationalism but civic nationalism, better described as patriotism;" state-centric view, Trump called "principled realism"--"views international institutions and global governance with great skepticism" where "cooperation depends on reciprocity;" armed diplomacy, where "understood properly, force and diplomacy are two sides of the same coin;" prioritizing economic growth and leveraging the new geopolitics of energy, that "exploited America’s energy potential to take advantage of the new geopolitics of energy;" and defense of liberal principles, in that "It cannot unilaterally spread democracy throughout the world."
Sohrab Ahmari, Patrick Deneen, and Gladden Pappin in “Hawks Are Standing in the Way of a New Republican Party,” rebuke those they accuse of pushing 'liberal imperialism.' Theirs is a denunciation of neoconservatives. They would replace “old, broken fusion of pro-business libertarians, religious traditionalists, and foreign-policy hawks” with a new consensus of two pillars: "The first is a 'sound restraint, especially where the United States doesn’t have formal treaty obligations, and a general retrenchment of the Western alliance’s ambitions.' The second is 'domestic industrial prowess and energy independence.'"
The author says that lacks prudence, which "requires an examination of the means available in light of the ends one seeks. This means answering these questions: what are the U.S. interests at stake? What are the courses of action available? What are the risks associated with the various courses of action? What is the likelihood of success?"
The first pillar derives from John Quincy Adams who wrote in 1821, “Wherever the standard of freedom and Independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will [America’s] heart, her benedictions and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.”
The second pillar addresses the shortcomings of market fundamentalism to address strategic issues. "But the sort of “industrial policy” that they recommend has a long history of failure, which they fail to acknowledge."
U.S. foreign policy has oscillated between idealistic Wilsonianism (Bill Clinton, Barack Obama, and Joe Biden) and muscular Wilsonianism (George W. Bush and neoconservatives). Trump rejected both.
Ahmari, Deneen, and Pappin idea of "doctrinaire restraint is just as formulaic and lacking in prudence as the options they criticize."
The author calls his "Prudent American Realism:" "this general approach has in common is the recognition that the internal character of regimes matters and that our foreign policy must reflect the fundamental principles of democratic republicanism. But unlike liberal internationalism, which holds that international law and institutions alone are sufficient to achieve peace, this approach understands that there are certain problems that can be addressed only through the prudent exercise of power.... Second, a new consensus should accept the need for forward defense, forward presence, and freedom of navigation.... Third, this consensus should recognize that the internal character of regimes matters for U.S. foreign policy, a principle that can be found in Thucydides...the security of a state is enhanced when it is surrounded by others that share its principles and interests. ...Fourth, this consensus must accept the classical connection between force and diplomacy. ...Finally, as the authors of the Times column rightly argue, a new conservative foreign policy consensus should not hesitate to use economic power as an instrument of foreign policy."
The floor is open to any thoughts and ideas on foreign policy.