Read these:
https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ro...-Ohio-1873.pdf
https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/fi...ohio-1873.html
Although the Eller court recognized the significance of the fact that the plaintiff had come to the nuisance, the court clearly did not view that fact as an absolute defense. It was just one of several factors, along with the nature of the defendant's business and that of the other businesses in the area, the character of the machinery, and the defendant's manner of using the machinery, which the jury should have considered in determining the reasonableness of the interference. Id., at paragraph one of the syllabus.
Later cases have continued to view the fact that a plaintiff came to an existing nuisance not as a complete defense, but as a significant factor which must be considered in determining whether the alleged invasion by the defendant constituted a nuisance to the plaintiff. In Downs v. Greer Beatty Clay Co. (1905), 29 Ohio C.C. 328, 332-333, priority of occupation and location were again recognized as factors to be considered. The other factors considered by the Downs court were the character of the industry and nature of the injury.
This balancing-of-equities approach was more explicitly applied in Stothfang v. Cincinnati Aluminum Casting Co. (1920), 13 Ohio App. 334, an action to enjoin an entire manufacturing business brought by a homeowner on the edge of a manufacturing district. Again, the court considered numerous equitable factors to reach its decision that defendant's business should not be enjoined. Given the location of the plaintiff's house, that other businesses in this area also caused fumes and noises, and that the defendant had made efforts to reduce the fumes coming from the plant, the court refused to require the defendant to cease operations. Id., at 338-341. Although the injunction was denied, the case was retained for a reasonable time while the defendant made efforts to reduce the disturbance it caused to the neighborhood. Id., at 341.