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Thread: The Tank Is Not Obsolete, and Other Observations About the Future of Combat

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    The Tank Is Not Obsolete, and Other Observations About the Future of Combat

    Many claim that tanks are obsolete now pointing to their high rate of destruction in the Russo-Ukraine war. However, most of those kills were due to improper deployment of tanks. Tanks are still a highly effective force multiplier on the modern battlefield.


    The Tank Is Not Obsolete, and Other Observations About the Future of Combat - War on the Rocks

    After six months of war in Ukraine, some observers have insisted that “we are seeing the very nature of combat change” and that tanks, along with fighter jets and warships, “are being pushed into obsolescence.”


    But it is too soon to write off the tank, and we should resist jumping to other sweeping conclusions about the future of warfare based on a conflict whose lessons are not yet clear. There is still much about this war that is not known from open sources, and there is good reason to think that the conditions that marked its early phases will not necessarily be relevant to future conflicts. As a result, specific weapon systems may appear to be ineffective based on how and where they are employed, not necessarily due to their inherent shortcomings.


    The available data from Ukraine, as well as the recent war in Nagorno-Karabakh, indicate that tanks are still critical in modern warfare and their vulnerabilities have been exaggerated. Russia’s heavy tank losses can be explained by employment mistakes, poor planning and preparation, insufficient infantry support, and Ukrainian artillery. The use of Javelins and other light anti-tank systems in Ukraine has not demonstrated that the tank is obsolete any more than the Sagger anti-tank guided missile did in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, as discussed by David Johnson in these pages.


    Russian Missteps and Tank Losses


    Russia’s initial operation prioritized speed and secrecy above all other factors. Because they expected little resistance, Russian forces made minimal attempts at executing a coherent combined-arms operation, which would have required careful coordination and planning between air, ground, and naval forces. Russian ground units simply drove toward cities, unprepared for a fight. In addition, Russian forces were given insufficient time to prepare for such a complex operation. This decision was likely made at the political level, since the Russian military’s doctrine, exercises, and previous conflicts all prioritized combined arms. As a result, the opening phase of this war may not be a good indication of how effective tanks and other systems would prove to be in a better-organized military operation. Many of the supposed weaknesses of manned ground, aerial, and naval platforms were a result of these mistakes, not a reflection of their technical relevance in modern warfare.


    Of the 994 Russian tank losses documented by the Oryx blog, a website that uses open source tools to count destroyed Russian equipment, at least 340 — or 34 percent — were abandoned. (The figure jumps to 38 percent if damaged tanks are included.) This percentage was highest during the first month of the war when Russia’s tank losses were the greatest. At the beginning of April, for example, 53 percent of Russia’s recorded tank losses were abandoned. In addition, many of the tanks listed as destroyed were first abandoned by their crews and destroyed by Ukrainian soldiers who either could not or chose not to capture them. This means that as many as 50 percent of Russia’s documented lost tanks may have been first abandoned by their crews. In other words, the tanks themselves were not the problem — they were simply employed poorly, which led to their high losses.


    Three key issues explain Russia’s tank losses: lack of warning and preparation, poor strategy that exacerbated logistics issues, and insufficient infantry to protect them. Tanks are among the most logistics-intensive pieces of equipment. They require routine maintenance, spare parts, and substantial fuel to keep them operational. Because of these requirements, logistics planning is more important for tank battalions and regiments than nearly any other type of military unit, but Russia’s disorganized invasion exacerbated these logistical challenges. Russia’s operation was marked by extreme efforts at compartmentalization and secrecy, with most soldiers finding out that they were going to war only a few hours before the invasion. As a result, commanders and logisticians were given insufficient warning to plan and prepare. Tank units did not have enough time to schedule proper maintenance or to procure sufficient spare parts, fuel, and other items necessary for a conventional war that would involve long-distance movements.


    Moreover, Russia’s plan involved too many axes of advance, many of which were not mutually supporting, and Russian Ground Forces units were tasked with advancing at an extremely rapid rate. As a result, Russian forces often moved beyond artillery, electronic warfare, and air defense coverage, further exacerbating logistics issues. The rapid advance also meant that Russia had longer and more exposed supply lines, and its logistics convoys were not prepared to handle ambushes from territorial defense forces. It is not surprising that tank units performed comparatively poorly at the beginning of the war, since they require greater preparation and planning than lighter units.
    The Tank Is Not Obsolete, and Other Observations About the Future of Combat - War on the Rocks
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    carolina73's Avatar Senior Member
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    How would Desert Storm have worked without tanks?

    We ran over more Iraqi soldiers than we shot. How many drone missiles would that have taken at $150,000 a shot?

    Also, I saw a interview with a company that is testing a electronics killer that will take out drones and other guidance systems within miles of a target. You can't do that to the tank rounds.
    Let's go Brandon !!!

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    Quote Originally Posted by carolina73 View Post
    How would Desert Storm have worked without tanks?

    We ran over more Iraqi soldiers than we shot. How many drone missiles would that have taken at $150,000 a shot?

    Also, I saw a interview with a company that is testing a electronics killer that will take out drones and other guidance systems within miles of a target. You can't do that to the tank rounds.
    Desert Storm was primarily a tank war- the ground attack phase. I was essentially light infantry (82nd ABN). We were way out on the far west and hooked into and across the Iraqi desert to take out fixed Iraqi defensive positions. Trench and bunker clearing. Fun stuff. Saddam did what we thought he would. Send Republican Guard tank divisions from Kuwait to attack us. 7th Corps slammed into their flank when they did. The Iraqi lead division (Hammurabi if I recall correctly) was outside of 7th Corps engagement zone and kept rolling toward us. The 3rd Inf (Mech) was behind us. They flanked them which was good for us, since light infantry is like scissors to rock in a desert. We would have filled up a lot of body bags otherwise.

    Yes, modern tanks have ECM suites. Soon they will also have laser to get the drones.
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