The author served as an NCO and warrant officer in the 7th SFG and is of the opinion that the US sucks at irregular warfare.
THE US HAS FAILED AT IRREGULAR WARFARE. THIS MUST STOP
Since the Vietnam War, the United States has been involved in several major and minor conflicts where irregular warfare (IW) has been waged. And the success the US has had has paled in comparison to its failures.
It is a maddening track record for the country with the world’s most powerful and advanced military. Lieutenant General Charlie Cleveland correctly pointed out that the U.S. has not been successful beyond the tactical level, despite the expertise of our troops who excel at the tactical level.
LTG Cleveland added that the wars that the U.S. has conducted in the past 40 years revolved not around defeating a conventional army but defeating armed civilians or paramilitary forces. These combat operations are characterized not by seizing and holding territory but by success in winning populations (hearts and minds, if you will).
It is imperative that the U.S. wins the population-centric struggle. To do so, local partnerships and gaining the population’s trust, influence, and legitimacy.
What is irregular warfare and why does the US fail at it?
The United States’ joint doctrine defines irregular warfare (IW) as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations.” Irregular warfare includes the concepts of unconventional warfare and asymmetric warfare. It use to be called “low-intensity conflict.”U.S. Naval War College professor Carnes Lloyd has characterized IW as “distinguished from other warfare by the extent to which politics dictates not merely strategy but military operations and even tactics.”Many of the hostile actors that the U.S. has faced have used coercive policies and politics, subversion, propaganda, as well as assassination, terrorism, and the creation of proxy governments to achieve their aims. Continued use by the U.S. of massive military might alone wasn’t sufficient to defeat those actors.
The main issue is that the U.S. government was still using the Cold War scenario of trying to defeat a near-peer adversary on the conventional battlefield. That strategy was altered after the failure at Desert One in Iran, which resulted in the creation of the Special Operations Command (SOCOM). The second change came in 2004 when the government tasked the intelligence services to go after al-Qaeda.
Despite this, the U.S. still doesn’t have a lead agency for IW in its defense or intelligence apparatus.
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The U.S. military believes war and politics are separate entities. This misconception has become integrated into our strategies and needs to change.
According to retired Marine General Anthony Zinni irregular warfare requires cultural intelligence.
“What I need to understand is how these societies function. What makes them tick? Who makes the decisions? What is it about their society that is so remarkably different in their values, the way they think, compared to my values and the way I think?” Zinni said.
The U.S. tries to project our vision of a society onto other nations where it doesn’t fit.