As with everything else, adapt or die.
Is the Sun Finally Setting on the Attack Helicopter? Here’s Everything You Need to Know
Perhaps one of the most motivational sights on the modern battlefield is a friendly attack helicopter, bristling with guns, rockets, and missiles, dipping low as it plunges forward to deal death and destruction upon the enemy.
Yet, evidence suggests that if the attack helicopter survives on the modern battlefield that image may have to change, with armed helicopters attacking their targets far behind friendly lines. Blame it on the inherent nature of helicopters themselves, and the proliferation of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles that can swat them like flies.
Here’s what you need to know about the future of the attack helicopter.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine is now 455 days old. Both Russia and Ukraine have lost a large number of attack helicopters over the course of the conflict; according to the Oryx blog, Russia has confirmed losses of at least 62 attack helicopters to combat, including 35 Kamov Ka-52 “Alligators”, 12 Mil Mi-28 “Havocs”, 9 Mi-35s, and 6 older Mi-24 “Hinds.” These are devastating losses, with the Ka-52s lost representing 30 percent of Russia’s entire fleet of “Alligators.”
Ukraine has made out slightly better, losing just four Mi-24 attack helicopters, but those four still represent over 10 percent of its entire force of armed helicopters.
What caused such heavy losses? As the attacker, Russia’s helicopters will be put in more vulnerable situations than Ukraine’s, as the helos are sent to areas where the enemy is expected to be dug in and waiting for them. But magnifying the problem is the huge number of short-range surface-to-air missiles that NATO and the west sent to Ukraine. NATO has sent thousands of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), including at least 2,557 FIM-92 Stingers and an unknown number of Piorun, Sungur, Strela-2, Igla, and RBS-70 missile systems. These missile systems, easy to operate and deadly with a high degree of accuracy, have scored several high-profile shootdowns of Russian fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft.
Float Like a Butterfly, Sting Like a Bee
The modern attack helicopter was developed during the Vietnam War. The U.S. Army made extensive use of helicopters to transport troops to and from the battlefield, and these often came under intense ground fire. After first modifying transport helicopters to carry rockets and additional machine guns, the Army decided it wanted a dedicated, armed helicopter capable of escorting transport helicopters and serving in the role of flying artillery.
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Can the Attack Helicopter Survive?
The United States operates 819 Apache and 91 AH-1Z attack helicopters, making the platform a significant investment in firepower. At $36 million a pop, the AH-64 Apache doesn’t come cheap. With a crew of two, it also places two humans in harm’s way, and as the war in Ukraine has demonstrated, crews of helicopters downed by MANPADS often don’t survive being shot down. If the attack helicopter is obsolete, there is a strong incentive to retire them quickly and move on to something else—perhaps armed drones.
“I think the jury is out regarding attack helicopters,” Mark Cancian, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, tells Pop Mech. “They have not had much success in the war in Ukraine, and Ukraine is not asking for any, which indicates a lack of interest based on wartime experience.”
However, new weapons and tactics could save the platform. The U.S. Army is shifting away from anti-tank missiles that require direct line of sight to so-called “Air Launched Effects” (ALEs). ALEs are essentially kamikaze drones equipped with a two-way datalink and a shaped charge anti-tank warhead. An attack helicopter can launch an ALE and guide it on an exploratory path beyond the crew’s field of view, searching for enemies, then sending the ALE diving down onto found enemy targets for destruction. This allows the attack helicopter to not only stay out of range of enemy short-range missiles, but also collect intelligence on enemy positions. However, virtually any helicopter can launch ALEs, even transport helicopters, arguably making an expensive, dedicated attack helicopter unnecessary.
The armed helicopter, Cancian warns, could be an inflection point. “It might be that new weapons and tactics will reestablish their value on the battlefield ... but at some point, unmanned systems would do just as well.” That could mean a range of unmanned systems, even an attack helicopter close in size to the Apache, but without the life-support systems required for a human crew.